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INTRODUCTION 
The year 1881 is memorialized in nearly every Turk’s mind, 
as the year when the story of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk began.1 His 
life and accomplishments as the “immortal leader” of the 
Turkish army and as the founder and first President of the 
Turkish Republic are imprinted in every Turk’s mind.2 Turkish 
                                                                                                             
*J.D. Candidate, 2012, Fordham University School of Law; B.A. Economics, Middle 
Eastern and Islamic Studies, 2009, New York University. The author is of Turkish origin 
and has lived in Istanbul, Turkey for over two decades. She would like to thank her 
parents and her grandfather for encouraging her to pursue a legal education and her 
dear friend Sera N. Önalan for her support and assistance. 
1. See Mustafa Kemal Atatürk—His Life, ATATURK.COM, http://www.ataturk.com/
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=13&Itemid=31 (last visited Feb. 9, 
2011) (summarizing the life of Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic, including 
his birth year, birth place, and information about his family members); see Soner 
Çağaptay, Editorial, Erdogan’s Turn to Reshape Turkey, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 2011, at A17 
(arguing that Atatürk is turned into a cult.). 
2. See İlköğretim Ve Ortaöğretim Kurumlarinda Atatürk İnkilap Ve İlkelerinin 
Öğretim Esasları Yönergesi, Tebliğler Dergisi, No: 2104, 1981–82 Academic Years 
(providing a guideline for teaching standards required by the Ministry of Education for 
primary and secondary education classes including history courses, where an emphasis 
is to be made on the superiority of Atatürk’s personality as well as his reforms); see also 
Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası [Constitution] Nov. 7, 1982, pmbl. (Turk.). An English 
translation is available at http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1982Constitution-1995-1.pdf. 
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children are exposed to books filled with detailed descriptions 
and pictures of Atatürk’s life beginning in the first grade.3 These 
lessons are interwoven with the study of Turkish history, 
democracy, and nationalism.4 As a result, the Turkish identity, as 
established by Atatürk, is deeply ingrained throughout society, 
particularly in the lives of males, who have to complete 
mandatory military service.5 During the eighteen months they 
serve in the military, young Turkish men are exposed to the 
principle that the Turkish Armed Forces are the ultimate 
defenders of Turkish democracy.6 
And, there is a strong tradition of military involvement in 
Turkish politics.7 In the past eighty-eight years, the Turkish 
Armed Forces, as the “guardian” of the secular republic, have 
                                                                                                             
3. See TALİM VE TERBİYE KURULU BAŞKANLIĞI, İLKÖĞRETIM 1–5. SINIF 
PROGRAMLARI TANITIM EL KİTABI 28 (2005) (summarizing the topics covered in 
Turkish classes from first to fifth grade, including information about Atatürk’s family, 
education, military service, political activism, and personality, as well as his public 
reforms and revolutions). See generally İsmail H. Demircioğlu, Does the Teaching of History 
in Turkey Need Reform?, 2 INT’L. J. HIST. LEARNING, TEACHING & RES. 1, 2–3 (Dec. 2001), 
http://www.heirnet.org/IJHLTR/journal3/turkey.pdf (noting the views of some 
scholars that education in Turkey is dominated by nationalist views, always depicting 
Turks as “powerful and all-conquering”). 
4. See Demircioğlu, supra note 3, at 2 (describing the dominance of nationalist 
views in Turkish education); see also The Turkish Educational System, THE TURKISH 
FULBRIGHT COMMISSION, http://www.fulbright.org.tr/en/about-turkey/turkish-
educational-system (last visited Aug. 16, 2011) (stating that basic education in Turkey 
includes the history of the Turkish Republic and Atatürk’s reforms). 
5. See Directorate for Movements of Persons, Migration and Consular Affairs, 
Asylum and Migration Div., U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Turkey/Military Service, 
9–11 (July 2001), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/467010bd2.pdf (discussing 
relevant legislation to military service in Turkey and noting that the Turkish armed 
forces regard themselves as guardians of Atatürk’s principles). See generally Law No. 
1111 of June 21, 1927, art. 1, Resmi Gazete [R.G.] No. 631-635 (July 17, 1927) (Turk.) 
(providing that “every male Turkish citizen is obliged to perform his military service in 
accordance with this law”). 
6. See Directorate for Movements of Persons, Migration and Consular Affairs, 
Asylum and Migration Division, supra note 5, at 11 (observing that the Turkish armed 
forces regard themselves as “guardians” of Atatürk’s principles); see also Çağrı Yıldırım, 
The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics and European Union Membership Negotiations, 
BALKANALYSIS.COM (Dec. 2, 2010), http://www.balkanalysis.com/turkey/2010/12/02/
the-role-of-the-military-in-turkish-politics-and-european-union-membership-
negotiations/ (noting that the duty of the Turkish armed forces is to protect the 
Turkish territory and republic as stipulated by the constitution and that this duty has 
justified three military interventions). 
7. See Yıldırım, supra note 6 (discussing military involvement in Turkish politics 
since Ottoman times); see also infra Part I.B (analyzing the role of military in Turkish 
politics). 
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taken over the government three times, intervening until a new 
round of civilian elections could be held.8 The last of these three 
coups d’état took place on September 12, 1980, leaving Turkey 
with an authoritarian constitution that has been in effect since 
1982 (“1982 Constitution”).9 
Although modified several times in the last three decades, 
specifically within the framework of European Union (“EU”) 
reforms, the 1982 Constitution has allowed the military to 
remain highly influential in Turkish politics.10 The most 
significant reforms took place in 2010, when the ruling Justice 
and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (“AKP”)), 
affiliated with Islamist political ideology, announced a 
constitutional reform package (“Package”), aimed at 
democratizing the 1982 Constitution.11 Due to the Islamist 
ideological background of many AKP members, the Package 
caused turmoil among some citizens who perceived the proposal 
as a threat to Atatürk’s secular democracy, and they demanded 
                                                                                                             
8. See Yıldırım, supra note 6 (noting that the military is the “guardian” of the 
secular republic and has intervened by taking over the government three times). See, 
e.g., infra note 75 and accompanying text (giving the example of the 1983 elections, 
until which the military exercised power in politics). 
9. See Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası Nov. 7, 1982 (Turk.); Pelin Turgut, Turkey 
Braces for Key Vote over Its Future, TIME (Sept. 11, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/
world/article/0,8599,2017448,00.html (“The current [constitution] is an authoritarian 
holdover from a 1980 coup, drafted by generals and designed to enshrine the power of 
the state over the individual.”); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Background 
Notes: Turkey (Mar. 12, 2010) (listing the passage date of the current Turkish 
constitution (“1982 Constitution”) and the years it has subsequently been amended); 
Metin Heper, Consolidating Turkish Democracy, J. DEMOCRACY 105, 105 (1992) (listing 
the three military interventions in 1960, 1971, and 1980). 
10. See MEHMET FEVZİ BİLGİN, CONSTITUTION, LEGITIMACY AND DEMOCRACY IN 
TURKEY, 135, 142 (Said Amir Arjomand ed., 2008) (noting that the 1982 Constitution 
has been modified numerous times and that the military is influential in Turkish 
politics); see also Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasasi Nov. 7, 1982 (Turk.) (amended 2010). 
A version of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, as amended since 1982, is 
available at http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1982ay.htm. 
11. See SELIN M. BÖLME & TAHA ÖZHAN, SETA FOUNDATION FOR POLITICAL, 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH, BRIEF NO: 47, POLICY BRIEF: CONSTITUTIONAL 
REFERENDUM IN TURKEY 2, 3–8 (Aug. 2010), available at http://www.setav.org/Ups/
dosya/44512.pdf [hereinafter POLICY BRIEF] (discussing the Adalet ve Kalkınma 
Partisi’s (“AKP”) announcement in March 2010 of a constitutional amendment 
package (“Package”) aimed at democratizing Turkey’s constitution); see also infra notes 
94–97 (providing the relationship between former Islamist parties, such as the Refah 
Partisi (“RP”), the Fazilet Partisi (“FP”), and the AKP). 
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Turkish military intervention.12 Despite the ideological turmoil, 
the Turkish public voted to amend the Constitution on 
September 12, 2010—exactly thirty years after the military 
intervention, which resulted in the creation of that very 
document.13  
This Comment questions whether the Package promotes a 
civil and more democratic constitution by weakening the 
military’s role in politics or whether the Package actually 
promotes a so-called hidden Islamist agenda advocated by the 
AKP, threatening Atatürk’s modern secular Turkey.14 Part I of 
this Comment examines the unique geographical and social 
position of Turkey as part of both Europe and the Middle East, 
summarizes key events in modern Turkish history, and examines 
the importance of the military in Turkish politics. Part II 
introduces the language of the Package and the referendum 
process. Part III analyzes the amendments considered at the 
national referendum and predicts their legal effects with regard 
to Turkey’s EU candidacy and the balance of power among 
domestic institutions. This Comment concludes that, although 
the revisions to the Constitution were welcomed as a move 
toward a more modern and democratic state, the selective 
nature of the Package and the Islamist roots of some AKP 
politicians raise questions about the true motivation of these 
reforms. 
                                                                                                             
12. See infra note 130 and accompanying text (noting that a segment of the 
Turkish population regards the AKP’s efforts to amend the Constitution as a threat to 
secular democracy). 
13. See Christopher Torchia, Turks Vote for Constitutional Amendments: Approval 
Viewed as Boost Towards Bid to Join EU, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 13, 2010, at 6 (reporting 
Turkish approval of the Package); see also Sebnem Arsu & Dan Bilefsky, Turkish 
Constitutional Changes Pass by a Wide Margin, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2010, at A4 (reporting 
the results of the constitutional referendum that fell on the thirtieth anniversary of the 
military coup that sanctioned the 1982 Constitution); Turkey Vote Boosts PM Future, AL 
JAZEERA (Sept. 13, 2010), http://english.aljazeera.net/video/europe/2010/09/
201091375453805603.html (“With nearly 80 percent turnout, poll results show that 58 
percent voted in favour of the referendum.”). 
14. See infra notes 130, 225 and accompanying text (describing the segments in 
Turkish society that suspect a hidden Islamist agenda behind the AKP’s policies); cf. 
infra note 230 (noting the view that regards the Package as an effort to democratize 
Turkish politics). 
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I. BACKGROUND: SUMMARY OF TURKISH HISTORY AND 
POLITICS, 1923–PRESENT 
This Part explores the history of the Turkish Republic beginning 
with its founding in 1923. Sections A and B discuss the 
importance of Turkey’s location and history as well as their 
impact on Turkish politics and society. These subsections focus 
on the role of religion and the military. Section C presents a 
brief account of Turkish politics after the introduction of the 
multi-party regime and the three subsequent military coups 
d’état that occurred in the following four decades. Section D 
examines the historical context of the 1982 Constitution, which 
the Package aims to revise. Sections E and F discuss the balance 
between the military and political parties in the last decade, 
including the AKP, currently the ruling party in Turkey, and its 
forerunner the Welfare Party. Section G summarizes the EU 
application process under the AKP governments and reviews 
recent reforms and achievements. 
A. Turkey: A Country on Two Continents 
Modern Turkey is a Eurasian country that encompasses vast 
territory across the Anatolian Peninsula in southwestern Asia 
and in southeastern Europe.15 Turkey cannot be called either 
wholly European or Middle Eastern.16 It is a bridge between the 
West and the East, at a crossroads where the two cultures meet 
and interact.17 Nevertheless, along with Turkey’s unique and 
                                                                                                             
15. See The World Factbook: Turkey, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html (last 
visited Sept. 15, 2011) (specifying Turkey’s geographic location); see also Turkey Country 
Profile, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/1022222.stm 
(last visited Sept. 15, 2011) (giving an overview of Turkey, including the “strategically 
important” location of the country). 
16. See, e.g., Owen Matthews, Eastern Star: Turkey’s Prime Minister Has Become a Hero 
in the Middle East for Standing Up to the West. But Islam Isn’t What’s Driving Him, 
NEWSWEEK, Sept. 20, 2010, at 44 (observing that in recent years, Turkey has been 
moving eastwards); see Susanna Dokupil, The Separation of Mosque and State: Islam and 
Democracy in Modern Turkey, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 53, 60 (2002) (comparing Turkey to 
Janus, with two faces in opposite directions, in this case the East and the West). 
17. See David J. Gottlieb et al., Conference on Comparative Law—Recent Developments 
in European, American, and Turkish Law: “Team Kansas” Goes to Turkey, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 
671, 703 (1997) (“Turkey is where Western and Eastern cultures meet [and] 
interact.”); see also Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turk., 
The US-Turkey Relationship, Address before the Council on Foreign Relations (Apr. 
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strategic location comes specific domestic and international 
geopolitical challenges.18 Since its founding in 1923, Turkey has 
experienced constant tensions between its secular-Western and 
conservative-Islamist citizens, manifested in violent clashes 
between these two ideological groups.19 These tensions have led 
to: student protests at universities; mass arrests of journalists, 
politicians, and academics for political affiliation; and numerous 
unsolved murders.20 The basic tension between the Western-
leaning, nationalist-secular Turks and the Eastern-leaning, 
conservative-Islamist Turks arises from the assumption that Islam 
and democracy are incompatible.21 In the case of Turkey, while 
ninety-nine percent of the population is Muslim, Article 2 of the 
1982 Constitution states that the country is a democratic, 
secular, and social state, governed by the rule of law.22 In fact, 
Turkey is the only democracy with a Western-secularist legal 
                                                                                                             
14, 2010) in FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 14, 2010, (emphasizing Turkey’s 
multidimensional, geopolitical characteristic stemming from being “right at the center 
of Afro-Euro-Asia”). 
18. See infra notes 19–21 and accompanying text (discussing the conflicts among 
different cultural and ideological groups, as one of the major social challenges facing 
Turkey). 
19. See Dokupil, supra note 16, at 80, 91 (exemplifying the governments’ inability 
to control civil disorder right before the 1971 and 1980 military interventions); see also 
Murat Somer, Moderate Islam and Secularist Opposition in Turkey: Implications for the World, 
Muslims and Secular Democracy, 28 THIRD WORLD Q. 1271, 1274 (2007) (describing the 
rivalry between secular-nationalists and Islamic-conservatives). 
20. See SİNA AKŞİN, KISA TÜRKİYE TARİHİ [A BRIEF HISTORY OF TURKEY] 271–72 
(2007) (discussing the social chaos and violence on the streets of Turkey prior to the 
1980 coup); see also Ali Necati Doğan, 12 Eylül Darbesi, Öncesi Olaylar, Gerekçeleri ve 
Sonuç, MILLIYET BLOG (Sept. 13, 2009), http://blog.milliyet.com.tr/Blog.aspx?
 BlogNo=202714 (discussing events, reasons and results of the 1980 Coup including the 
list of unresolved political murders). 
21. See, e.g., Padideh Ala’i, Turkey: At the Crossroads of Secular West and Traditional 
East, 24 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 679, 681 (2009) (stating that the historian Feroz Ahmad 
maintains that Kemalists were not against Islam and that contemporary Turkish society 
is not in danger of becoming another Iran); see Ian Ward, The Culture of Enlargement, 12 
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 199, 220 (indicating that the original Kemalist construction of 
modern Turkey “assumed a natural dichotomy between secularism and Islam,” holding 
democracy and Islam incompatible). 
22. See Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasasi Nov. 7, 1982, art. 2 (Turk.) (“Türkiye 
Cumhuriyeti . . . Atatürk Milliyetçiliğine bağlı, başlangıçta belirtilen temel ilkelere 
dayanan, demokratik, laik ve sosyal bir hukuk Devletidir.”); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of 
State, supra note 9 (“The 1982 Constitution . . . proclaims Turkey’s system of 
government as democratic, secular, and parliamentary.”); see also Press Release, U.S. 
Dep’t of State, supra note 9 (noting that Turkey’s population is ninety-nine percent 
Muslim). 
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framework adapted to an Islamic society.23 Turkey is a Muslim 
country considered to be not as Islamic as most of its eastern 
neighbors, but it is also a democracy considered to be not as 
European as its Western neighbors.24 This diversity prompts 
questions regarding religion’s role in society and politics, a 
subject that has dominated the Turkish public discourse since its 
founding.25 
B. The Role of Religion and the Military in Turkish Politics and Society 
Secularism in Turkey has been largely supported by the 
Western-educated elite, who also compose the most influential 
segments of society, including the business and political circles.26 
They, along with the military and the judiciary, form the secular 
nationalist stronghold of Turkish society.27 This select group of 
people resides primarily in Istanbul and Ankara, standing in 
great contrast to the often-less-educated citizens who reside in 
smaller cities and villages in Anatolia and who have been 
repeatedly excluded from economic and political arenas.28 The 
                                                                                                             
23. See Dokupil, supra note 16, at 55 (differentiating Turkey as the only secular 
Muslim state that is challenged by its incorporation of secularism and democracy in an 
Islamic society); see also History of Turkey—EU Relations, MINISTRY FOR EU AFFAIRS, 
REPULBIC OF TURK., available at http://www.abgs.gov.tr/ index.php?p=111&I=2 (last 
updated Apr. 6, 2007) (“Turkey is the only pluralist secular democracy in the Moslem 
world . . . .”). 
24. See Ward, supra note 21, at 217–18 (distinguishing Turkey as a country that is 
not as Islamic as other Muslim countries, but still too Islamic to be accepted by the 
EU); Davutoğlu, supra note 17, (providing the views of the Turkish Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Ahmet Davutoglu, on the unique geographical continuity of Turkey). 
25. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 9 (enumerating religion’s 
role in Turkish society and government as one of the issues dominating public 
discourse). See generally Dokupil, supra note 16, at 55 (analyzing the role of Islam in 
Turkish politics). 
26. See Dokupil, supra note 16, at 55 (indicating that Western democracy in 
Turkey is strongly advocated by educated elites and the military); see also Ward, supra 
note 21, at 218 (distinguishing the privileged status of the Western-educated elite in 
Turkish society and their views on secularism). 
27. See, e.g., Ibon Villelabeitia, Referendum Reveals Three Faces of Turkey, CYPRUS 
MAIL, Sept. 15, 2010 (revealing that Turkey’s secular establishment opposed the 
constitutional amendments); see Dokupil, supra note 16, at 55 (noting the support by 
the educated elite and the military for a Western-style democracy). 
28. See Ahmet İnsel, The AKP and Normalizing Democracy in Turkey, 102 S. ATLANTIC 
Q. 293, 297, 306 (2003) (pointing to the discrepancy between the secular urban elite 
and the less-educated masses); Dokupil, supra note 16, at 55 (stating that Islamist 
policies “resonate[] with the agricultural workers, small shopkeepers, and low-skilled 
laborers,” and describing the contrast between the urban elite and the rural masses); 
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exclusion of certain citizens from political power and the 
tension between the educated elite and the rural populations 
are two significant factors leading to the polarization between 
those who envision an Islamic Turkey and those who hope for a 
European Turkey.29 
The origins of military influence in Turkish politics precede 
even the founding of the Turkish Republic.30 Every Turkish 
constitution since 1921 has charged the military with protecting 
the state and has given the military the right and duty to 
intervene in the “name of the nation.”31 As such, the military has 
been seen as an important component of Turkey’s checks-and-
balances system.32 
Turkey’s constitution establishes a separation of powers as 
follows: the executive power belongs to the President and the 
Council of Ministers; the legislative power belongs to the 
Parliament—Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (“TBMM”), and the 
judiciary power belongs to the courts, with the Constitutional 
                                                                                                             
see also Villelabeitia, supra note 27 (“Since its establishment as a secular state in 1921 
Turkey has been traditionally rules by a Westernised elite in Istanbul and Ankara. The 
Anatolian masses were economically and politically excluded . . . .”). 
29. See, e.g., İnsel, supra note 28, at 306 (noting that the polarization in Turkey is 
between the republican elites and the rest of the population); see Ward, supra note 21, 
at 225 (employing the terms “Islamic Turkey” and “European Turkey” to describe the 
differing perspectives between conflicting factions in Turkey). 
30. See David Capezza, The Military in Politics: Turkey’s Military is a Catalyst for 
Reform, MIDDLE E. Q., Summer 2009, at 13 (“The military has deep roots in society, and 
its influence predates the founding of the republic.”); Yıldırım, supra note 6 (noting 
that the military’s involvement in politics began in Ottoman times and that it was the 
military who initiated the new republic’s political modernization process). 
31. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası Nov. 7, 1982, art. 117 (Turk.); see Law No. 211 
of Jan. 4, 1961, Resmi Gazete [R.G.] No. 10703 (Jan. 10, 1961) (Turk.) (“Silahlı 
Kuvvetlerin vazifesi; Türk yurdunu ve Anayasa ile tayin edilmiş olan Türkiye 
Cumhuriyetini kollamak ve korumaktır.”) Dinesh D. Banani, Reforming History: Turkey’s 
Legal Regime and Its Potential Accession to the European Union, 26 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 113, 115 (2003) (quoting Paul J. Magnarella, The Legal, Political and Cultural 
Structures of Human Rights Protections and Abuses in Turkey, 3 INT’L L. & PRAC. 439, 448 
(1994)) (noting that the Constitution gives “the military the right and duty to intervene 
in Turkish politics in the ‘name of the nation’”); see Capezza, supra note 30, at 13 
(emphasizing that from Turkey’s founding, the military has assumed the role of 
guarantors of the Constitution). 
32. See Capezza, supra note 30, at 13 (indicating that the Turkish military remains 
an important component of the checks-and-balances system); c.f. Arsu & Bilefsky, supra 
note 13, at A5 (quoting a Turkish columnist who fears the package of constitutional 
reforms passed in September 2010 would leave a system lacking checks and balances). 
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Court acting as the highest court responsible for judicial 
review.33 
Within this structure, the military guarantees and supervises 
secular democracy.34 To better understand the role of the 
military in Turkey today, it is useful to become familiar with the 
Ottoman-Turkish constitutional history and the founding 
principles of modern Turkey, as created by Atatürk. 
Turkish dynasties controlled Muslim territories in Central 
Asia, the Middle East, and Anatolia from the eleventh century 
until the founding of the Ottoman Empire in 1301.35 The 
Ottomans established their empire on “the principle of military 
conquest infused with religious fervor” and relied on a legal 
system based on the principles of Sharia—Islamic Law.36 After 
the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, a 
revolutionary political force, led by General Mustafa Kemal 
(later named Atatürk, “father of the Turks”), and independent 
from the Ottoman Empire’s political elite, emerged in eastern 
Anatolia.37 With the support of Anatolian Turks, these 
revolutionaries fought the Turkish War of Independence and 
established the TBMM in 1920.38 While the Turkish army battled 
                                                                                                             
33. See Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası Nov. 7, 1982, arts. 7–9 (Turk.) 
(enumerating the executive, legislative, and judiciary powers of the Turkish 
Constitution); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 9, (noting the 
separation of powers in Turkey). 
34. See Capezza, supra note 30, at 13 (noting the supervisory role of the military); 
see, e.g., ERGUN ÖZBUDUN & ÖMER F. GENÇKAYA, DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE POLITICS 
OF CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN TURKEY 21 (2009) (asserting that the 1982 Constitution 
stipulates the military’s role as the guardian of the state). 
35. See Dokupil, supra note 16, at 59 (stating that Ottomans controlled Islamic 
territories from the eleventh century to the fourteenth century); see also Ottoman Empire, 
BBC RELIGIONS (Sept. 4, 2009), http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/
history/ottomanempire_1.shtml (describing the origins of the Ottoman Empire). 
36. Dokupil, supra note 16, at 56–57, 59 (arguing that the law of the Ottomans was 
Sharia, a legal code based on the Qur’an and the Sunna, laws informed by the sayings 
and practices of Muhammad, the Prophet); Christian Rumpf, The Importance of 
Legislative History Materials in the Interpretation of Statutes in Turkey, 19 N.C. J. INT’L L. & 
COM. REG. 267, 269 (1994) (noting that the Ottoman legal system was based on Islamic 
law (Sharia)). 
37. See Rumpf, supra note 36, at 270 (explaining the creation of a sovereign 
Turkish government under Atatürk); see also Dokupil, supra note 16, at 65 (noting 
Atatürk’s leadership and the organization of a nationalist movement in central 
Turkey). 
38. See Dokupil, supra note 16, at 65–66 (summarizing the Republic’s founding 
including the creation of the Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (“TBMM”), the Parliament); 
see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 9, (noting that Atatürk led the 
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Western imperialists, the TBMM abolished the sultanate, 
expelled the Sultan, and officially declared the Republic of 
Turkey in 1923.39 During the next few years, the TBMM, under 
the leadership of Atatürk, transitioned Turkey from a monarchy 
into a liberal democracy by realizing reforms such as the 
adoption of the Turkish Civil Code, thus ending the rule of 
Sharia.40 
These liberal reforms reoriented the role of religion by 
removing it from the public sphere.41 Turkish society was now 
free from traditionally Islamic societal norms; science and 
reason formed the infrastructure of Turkey’s new, Western-style 
secular civil society.42 The collapse of the Islamic legal tradition 
                                                                                                             
Turkish Republic’s founding after the three-year War of Independence); Dankwart A. 
Rustow, Atatürk as Founder of a State, PHILOSOPHERS AND KINGS: STUDIES IN LEADERSHIP, 
793, 795–96 (1968) (describing Anatolia as Atatürk’s stronghold and the location from 
where he initiated the nationalist movement against the Allies and the Sultan); 
Founding of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, TÜRKIYE BÜYÜK MILLET MECLISI, 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/english/about_tgna.htm#FOUNDING%20OF%20THE%
20TURKISH%20GRAND%20NATIONAL%20ASSEMBLY (last visited Oct. 2, 2011) 
(“The Turkish Grand National Assembly, established on national sovereignty, held its 
first opening session . . . on 23 April 1920.”). 
39. See Dokupil, supra note 16, at 66 (summarizing the events leading to and 
following the proclamation of the Republic, including the separation of the sultanate 
from the caliphate and the abolishment of the sultan); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t 
of State, supra note 9 (noting that Atatürk led the founding of the Turkish Republic in 
1923). 
40. See, e.g., Law No. 671 of Nov. 25, 1925, Resmi Gazete [R.G.] No. 230 (Nov. 28, 
1925) (Turk.) (Hat Law of 1925) (restricting the use of religious headgear of citizens, 
without permission from the government). An English description of the Hat Law of 
1925 is available at http://www.kultur.gov.tr/EN/belge/2-15009/1925.html. See, e.g., 
Law No. 2596 of Dec. 3, 1934 Resmi Gazete [R.G.] No. 2879 (Dec. 13, 1934) (Turk.) 
(Clothing Reform of 1934) (prohibiting religious functionaries to appear in religious 
clothing outside of their place of worship or during religious services). An English 
description of the Clothing Reform of 1934 is available at http://www.kultur.gov.tr/
EN/belge/2-15022/1934.html. See Dokupil, supra note 16, at 68–70 (listing Atatürk’s 
reforms including the replacement of Sharia with a European Civil Code). 
41. See Dokupil, supra note 16, at 68–69 (analyzing some of Atatürk’s reforms as 
changing the relationship between religion and the state and banning vestiges of 
religion from the public sphere); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 9 
(indicating that the reforms between 1924 and 1934 formed the ideological base of the 
republic). 
42. See Dokupil, supra note 16, at 70–71 (quoting Ali Kazancigil, Democracy in 
Muslim Lands: Turkey in Comparative Perspective, 43 INT’L SOC. SCI. J. 343, 350 (1991)) 
(describing the newly identified Turkish society as one that is in “a cultural arena no 
longer structured by religious faith, but by reason and science” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
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was a major part of this redefinition.43 Initiated with the newly-
adopted Turkish Civil Code, the radical modernization and 
westernization of Turkish society was solidified by the 
transformation of the legal system from faith-based to secular.44 
The Six Arrows of Kemalism, the symbol for the Cumhuriyet 
Halk Partisi (“CHP”) [Republican People’s Party] represent the 
Western-political values Atatürk intended the new Turkish 
republic to embrace: republicanism, nationalism, populism, 
reformism, étatism, and secularism.45 Manifested in Atatürk’s 
reforms, these six principles constituted the ideological 
foundation of modern Turkey.46 The military and the judiciary 
in particular, which regard themselves as the guardians of 
Kemalism, have often clashed with Islamist political parties that 
gained influence throughout the 1960s and reopened the 
discourse on Islam’s role in Turkish politics.47 In response to the 
increasing popularity of such faith-based political ideologies, the 
military, in accordance with its constitutional powers, has 
intervened in Turkish politics three times in the past five 
                                                                                                             
43. See Arzu Oğuz, The Role of Comparative Law in the Development of Turkish Civil 
Law, 17 PACE INT’L L. REV. 373, 382–85 (2005) (describing how the elimination of 
Sharia and adoption of the Swiss Code transformed the Turkish legal system); see also 
Dokupil, supra note 16, at 70 (discussing some of the legal reforms initiated by Atatürk 
as redefining Turkish society). 
44. See Oğuz, supra note 43, at 380, 383 (discussing the adoption of the new civil 
code in Turkey, allowing the country’s legal system to transition from a faith-based 
Islamic one into a secular-western one); see also supra notes 39–42 and accompanying 
text (underlining Atatürk’s objective of creating a new Turkish identity detached from 
the old Islamic Ottoman one). 
45. See Dokupil, supra note 16, at 65 (identifying the Six Arrows of Kemalism); see 
also Ward, supra note 21, at 220 (outlining the six political values encouraged by 
Kemalism). CHP was founded by Atatürk and is currently the main opposition party in 
the TBMM. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 9 (listing the number of 
TBMM members each political party has in the government, with the AKP holding 337 
seats and CHP holding ninety-seven seats in 2010). 
46. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 9 (noting that the principles 
of Kemalism constitute the ideological base of modern Turkey); see also supra note 40 
and accompanying text (stating some of the reforms implemented under Atatürk). 
47. See Has Turkey’s Referendum Granted More Power to Erdogan?, DAILY TIMES (Pak.) 
(Sept. 15, 2010), http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\09\15\story_15-
9-2010_pg4_9 (noting that the military and the courts, as guardians of secular Turkey, 
have often clashed with current ruling party, the AKP); see also Dokupil, supra note 16, 
at 54 (discussing the steady proliferation of Islamist political ideologies since the 
1960s). 
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decades to restore the founding principles of Kemalism.48 In 
order to better understand the present dynamics between 
today’s “conservative globalists” and the “defensive nationalists,” 
the military coups of 1960, 1971, and 1980, along with their 
respective constitutions, are summarized below.49 
C. Coups d’État of 1960, 1971, and 1980 
Although Turkey remained neutral during most of World 
War II, with the implementation of the Truman Doctrine in 
1947 and the Marshall Plan in 1948, Turkey strengthened its 
political ties with the West, particularly the United States.50 In 
the midst of these international developments, and after twenty-
seven years of single-party rule, President Ismet Inönü initiated 
the implementation of a multi-party system in Turkey.51 
The newcomer Democratic Party (“DP”) introduced a 
religious revival by liberalizing Atatürk’s secularism and 
reformulating the Kemalist principles and their application to 
Turkish politics.52 The anti-liberal activism against the DP, along 
                                                                                                             
48. See supra note 8 and accompanying text; see also Kivanc Ulusoy, The “Democratic 
Opening” in Turkey: A Historical/Comparative Perspective, INSIGHT TURKEY, Apr.–June 
2010, at 20 (noting the three coups in 1960, 1971, and 1980); Capezza, supra note 30, at 
17–19 (summarizing the military interventions triggered by the rise of Islamist political 
parties). 
49. See ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 94 (identifying the tension and 
rift between the “conservative globalists” and the “defensive nationalists”); see also 
Capezza, supra note 30, at 13 (noting the three constitutions of Turkey). 
50. See STUART E. EIZENSTAT, ALLIED RELATIONS AND NEGOATIATIONS WITH 
TURKEY 1–2, available at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/rpt_9806_
ng_turkey.pdf (discussing Turkey’s Neutrality in World War II); see also AKŞİN, supra 
note 20, at 240 (summarizing events, such as the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, 
and Turkey’s entry into NATO as examples of the strengthening of its international 
ties); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 9 (describing the Truman Doctrine 
and the Marshall Plan as US policies supporting Greece and Turkey and other 
European countries with economic and military aid to prevent Soviet influence). 
51. See AKŞİN, supra note 20, at 240 (stating that President İsmet İnönü believed 
that to place Turkey on the same footing as Europe, the political pluralism dominating 
Europe at the time had to be enforced in Turkey); see also Irina A. Danilkina, Turkey: 
The Party System from 1963 to 2000, INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE POLITICAL PARTIES 
PROJECT, http://janda.org/ICPP/ICPP2000/Countries/7-MiddleEastNorthAfrica/78-
Turkey/Turkey63-00.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2011) (noting that between 1923 and 
1946, Atatürk’s Republican People’s Party was the only party in the country). 
52. See Dokupil, supra note 16, at 72–76 (describing the Democratic Party’s 
(“DP”) ten-year rule between 1950 and 1960); see also AKŞİN, supra note 20, at 245 
(explaining that the DP won sixty-six seats in the 465-seated TBMM in 1946). 
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with the worsening economy toward the end of the 1950s, 
exacerbated the clash between the secularists and Islamists.53 To 
restore social and political order, the military intervened on May 
27, 1960, which ended with the execution of Prime Minister 
Adnan Menderes, along with two other members of the 
cabinet.54 Unlike concurrent military interventions in Egypt, 
Greece, Iraq, and Syria, where the military refused to hand over 
power to the civilians for many years, in Turkey, the military 
created the Constituent Assembly, drafted a new constitution, 
and restored civilian politics eighteen months after the 
takeover.55 The concepts of a social state, political pluralism, 
parliamentary bicameralism, and the introduction of democratic 
institutions, such as the Constitutional Court, were some of the 
developments facilitated by the 1960 coup and the constitution 
it produced.56  
While the 1961 Constitution expanded civil liberties and 
social rights, it also demonstrated the military’s distrust in 
political parties.57 The 1961 Constitution institutionalized 
                                                                                                             
53. See AKŞİN, supra note 20, at 260 (citing poor management of the economy as 
one of the reasons for the 1960 Coup); see also Capezza, supra note 30, at 17 (“In April 
1960, amidst student protests and unrest between the government and the opposition 
parties, the military launched a coup . . . .”). 
54. See Capezza, supra note 30, at 17 (discussing the arrests and executions of 
prominent politicians after the 1960 coup); see also Danilkina, supra note 51 (noting 
that the 1960 military coup led to the termination of the DP). 
55. See Capezza, supra note 30, at 17 (differentiating between military 
interventions in neighboring nations); see also AKŞIN, supra note 20, at 260 (noting the 
establishment of the Constituent Assembly by military officials in early 1961); 
Danilkina, supra note 51 (describing the 1961 Constitution as one drafted to ensure 
liberalism and democracy). The phrase civilian politics refers to officials who are 
elected by the people, as opposed to members of the military who may intervene in and 
control Turkish politics. For an analysis of the civil-military relations in Turkey, see 
ŞULE TOKTAŞ & ÜMIT KURT, SETA FOUND. FOR POLITICAL, ECON. AND SOC. RESEARCH, 
BRIEF NO: 26, POLICY BRIEF: THE IMPACT OF EU REFORM PROCESS ON CIVIL-MILITARY 
RELATIONS IN TURKEY 1–2 (Nov. 2008), available at http://www.setav.org/ups/dosya/
7460.pdf. 
56. See Danilkina, supra note 51 (describing the 1961 Constitution as the most 
liberal constitution Turkey ever had); see also Dokupil, supra note 16, at 77 
(enumerating the most significant achievements of the 1961 Constitution, including 
the guarantee of certain civil liberties, the institution of judicial review by the newly 
established Constitutional Court, and the freedoms of religious faith and worship). See 
generally Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası July 20, 1961 (Turk.). An English translation is 
available at http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1961constitution-amended.pdf. 
57. See ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 16 (indicating that the 1961 
Constitution expanded social and political rights, but also reflected the military’s 
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judicial review and the complete independence of the judiciary, 
thus creating a checks and balances system in Turkish politics.58 
The establishment of an advisory board called the National 
Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu, “MGK”), composed of 
ministers and the highest chief officers in the Turkish army, 
provided the military a forum to voice its perspective, especially 
in matters concerning national security.59 In addition, Article 
141 of the 1961 Constitution established the Military Court of 
Cassation to review the decisions of military courts and those 
involving military officials.60 
After the 1960 coup d’etat, a new era began in Turkish 
politics.61 This new political period reflected an increase in the 
popularity of Islamist political ideologies, which, in opposition 
to the socialist and leftist movement, acquired an “anti-liberal, 
anti-socialist dimension” and resulted in the polarization of 
society between the conservative extreme right and the socialist 
                                                                                                             
distrust in elected civilian politicians); see also Danilkina, supra note 51 (noting that the 
1961 Constitution prohibited communist and religious parties and approved 
adversarial politics only if compatible with Atatürk’s mandated secular and republican 
state). 
58. See Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası July 20, 1961, art. 7 (Turk.) (“Judicial 
power shall be exercised by the independent courts on behalf of the Turkish nation.”); 
see also İsmet Giritli, Some Aspects of the New Turkish Constitution, MIDDLE E. J., Winter 
1962, at 9 (“One of the other fundamental principles embodied in the Constitution is 
that judges and courts of law shall be absolutely independent and free from 
interference in the performance of their duties.”). 
59. See ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 18 (introducing the Milli 
Güvenlik Kurulu (“MGK”) or the National Security Council); see also Yıldırım, supra 
note 6 (observing that the MGK was established to legitimize the military’s involvement 
in politics). 
60. See Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası July 20, 1961, art. 141 (Turk.) (providing 
the original language of Article 141 relating to the establishment of Military Court of 
Cassation); see also YILMAZ ENSAROĞLU, SETA FOUND. FOR POLITICAL, ECON., AND SOC. 
RESEARCH, SETA ANALİZ, İNSAN HAKLARI VE DEMOKRATİKLEŞME BAĞLAMINDA YENİ 
ANAYASA PAKETİ [SETA ANALYSIS, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL PACKAGE IN THE 
CONTEXT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIZATION] 42 (2010), available at 
http://www.setav.org/Ups/dosya/45997.pdf (discussing the expansion of the authority 
of military justice with each constitution). 
61. See Dokupil, supra note 16, at 77 (noting that Kemalist principles were 
adhered to in rhetoric but in practice were no longer being interpreted consistently 
with Atatürk’s original intent); see also Danilkina, supra note 51 (explaining that the 
Communist and the Islamist parties were banned after the coup because they were 
considered to be dangerous and did not comport with Atatürk’s secular and republican 
state). 
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left.62 Around 1970, this polarization escalated into street 
demonstrations, student protests, and economic unrest, all of 
which prompted the Turkish military to intervene in politics for 
a second time and decree the memorandum of March 12, 
1971.63 
The Memorandum of 1971 held the government 
responsible for not enacting the reforms envisaged by Atatürk 
and the Constitution of 1961.64 The government’s failure to 
enact these reforms critically affected the military because, as 
referenced above, the 1961 Constitution emphasized the 
significance of the military in Turkish politics as the 
constitutionally-authorized guardian of the secular state.65 While 
neither the Constitution of 1924, nor the Constitution of 1961, 
specifically endorse coups or give instructions explaining the 
circumstances under which the military should intervene, 
military intervention in politics has generally been supported 
throughout modern Turkish history by the public, who 
inherently distrust politicians.66 Following the 1971 Coup, 
                                                                                                             
62. See Dokupil, supra note 16, at 77–79 (describing the political developments 
and the social polarization between 1961 and 1970); see also Aira Chtena, The Military in 
Modern Turkey: A Lasting Political Force, J. STUDY PEACE & CONFLICT, 1998–99, available at 
http://jspc.library.wisc.edu/issues/1998-1999/article5.html, (noting that the 1971 
coup took place because the government had failed to assuage the conflict between the 
Marxist and ultra-right forces). 
63. See AKŞİN, supra note 20, at 267–68 (describing the social and economic unrest 
in Turkey which led to the military memorandum and stating that the Memorandum of 
March 12th held the President and the Prime Minister responsible for not enacting 
necessary reforms); see also Chtena, supra note 62 (indicating that, as a result of the 
“terrorism and disorder” in the country, the military issued a memorandum addressed 
to the President and the Prime Minister). 
64. See AKŞİN, supra note 20, at 268 (noting that the Memorandum of 1971 held 
the government responsible for political failures made out of line from the reforms of 
Atatürk and the 1961 Constitution); see also Dokupil, supra note 16, at 80 (reasoning 
that the government’s inability to govern, along with the social tensions and 
economical difficulties, led to the second military intervention in Turkish politics). 
65. See Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası July 20, 1961, art. 66 (Turk.) (introducing 
the article regarding the authority to permit the use of armed forces); see also supra 
notes 57–60 and accompanying text (discussing the novelties introduced to Turkish 
politics by the 1961 Constitution). Both the 1960 Coup and the 1971 Intervention were 
justified by the constitutional authorization bestowed on the Turkish army to interfere 
in the political realm. See also supra note 8 and accompanying text (explaining the role 
of the military as guardians of the secular Turkish Republic). 
66. See Capezza, supra note 30, at 13–14 (“While the Turkish Constitution 
certainly does not endorse coups, Turkish popular distrust of politicians has generally 
led the public to support military action.”); see also Chtena, supra note 62 (arguing that 
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instead of implementing a completely new constitution, the 
military carried out constitutional amendments in a closed 
process by implementing changes that strongly favored the 
military’s political ideology.67 In the aftermath of the 1971 
Memorandum, Turkey experienced the continuing presence of 
Islamic ideologies in the political arena.68 Toward the end of the 
decade, the country witnessed a resurrection of terrorism and 
political violence, universities controlled by ideological groups, 
and public areas as crime scenes of hundreds of unsolved 
murders.69 Aggravated by the economic crisis, continuing 
terrorism, and the political instability, which resulted in eleven 
successive governments in only nine years, the social 
polarization was exacerbated to the point where even the police 
force was divided along ideological lines.70  
In this unstable and violent environment, the military once 
again elected to invoke its constitutional power to protect the 
Turkish Republic. On September 12, 1980, the military carried 
out a non-violent coup that resulted in the arrest of over 100,000 
                                                                                                             
the military was actually ambivalent as to whether the Prime Minister resigned or not in 
the 1971 coup which reflects the military’s preference to remain insulated from 
politics). 
67. See ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 113–14 (describing the 1971 
amendment process as less democratic than the 1961 Constitution). These 
amendments can be grouped in three categories: a) those restricting some of the civil 
liberties and those limiting the review power of the courts, both of which were granted 
in the 1961 Constitution; b) those strengthening the Executive by bestowing on it 
legislative powers; and c) those advancing the autonomy of the military by exempting it 
from civilian judiciary review. See id. at 18. Unlike in the coups d’état of 1960 and 1980, 
in the 1971 intervention, the Parliament was not dissolved, political parties were not 
banned, and the Constitution was not replaced nor suspended. See Capezza supra note 
30, at 18. The military acted as a guide in re-establishing order. See id. 
68. See Dokupil, supra note 16, at 81 (stating that the Islamist ideology was 
represented by the Milli Selamet Partisi (“MSP”) [National Salvation Party] 
participation in coalition governments between 1973 and 1977); see also Chtena, supra 
note 62 (noting that the MSP participated in a coalition government with the CHP). 
69. See AKŞİN, supra note 20, at 271–72 (summarizing the social unrest prior to the 
coup, including the murders of well-known members of the police, unionists, judges, 
professors, and journalists); see also Dokupil, supra note 16, at 91 (giving an account of 
the civil disorder and violence between 1977 and 1980). 
70. See Capezza, supra note 30, at 18 (exemplifying the civil violence and political 
instability in the 1970s); Dokupil, supra note 16, at 91 (“In this polarized environment, 
even the police were divided along political lines, making enforcement of the law 
difficult and keeping terrorists under control impossible.”); see also Doğan, supra note 
20 (listing some of the political assassinations that took place before 1980). 
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people and the imprisonment of over 40,000 people.71 In 
contrast to the intervention in 1971, the military used a “heavy 
hand” to reestablish social and political order.72 The generals 
not only drafted a completely new constitution, but they also 
issued restrictive laws regulating political demonstrations and 
strikes, established curfew orders, and imposed martial law.73  
The extensiveness and radicalism of the 1980 military 
intervention is evident in both its duration and nature of 
reforms.74 Not only has the constitution it produced, albeit 
significantly amended, been in place for almost three decades, 
but, as evident in the fact that the next elections were not held 
until 1983, the military in 1980 was also much more reluctant to 
hand over the government to civilian politics.75 In order to 
comprehend the developments in Turkish politics over the last 
three decades, especially the rise and rule of the AKP since 2002 
and the dynamics of the 2010 referendum, the 1982 
Constitution and its historical context must be analyzed 
                                                                                                             
71. See Gareth Jenkins, Continuity and Change: Prospects for Civil-Military Relations in 
Turkey, INT’L AFF. 342 (2007) (“On 12 September 1980, as street fighting between leftist 
and rightist extremists brought the country to the brink of civil war, the military staged 
a third coup.”); see also Capezza, supra note 30, at 18 (discussing the results and impact 
of the 1980 coup); Chtena, supra note 62 (stating that the 1980 coup occurred only 
after law and order in the country collapsed and the memorandum issued by the 
military was “welcomed with relief”). 
72. See, e.g., supra note 67 and accompanying text (showing how military’s role in 
the 1971 Intervention was moderate); see Capezza, supra note 30, at 18 (noting that the 
military used a “heavy hand” to establish order). 
73. See The Turkish Army: Coups Away, ECONOMIST, Feb. 13, 2010 [hereinafter 
Coups Away] (characterizing the 1982 Constitution enacted by the army generals as 
“authoritarian”); see also Capezza, supra note 30, at 18 (describing how military 
dominated most aspects of Turkish society by taking strict control of universities, 
dismissing academics, dissolving existing political parties, and enforcing martial law). 
74. See Capezza, supra note 30, at 18 (noting that the 1980 military regime lasted 
three years and that the constitution it issued continues to apply today); see also Coups 
Away, supra note 73 (indicating that the 1982 Constitution, which promoted the 
objectives of the military, is still in force today). 
75. See BİLGİN, supra note 10, at 141–42 (indicating that the 1982 Constitution has 
been amended numerous times); see also AKŞİN, supra note 20, at 280–81 (stating that 
elections were held in 1983); Capezza, supra note 30, at 18 (noting that primary power 
rested in the military leadership until Anavatan Partisi (“ANAP”) [Motherland Party] 
assumed office in the 1983 elections); ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 19 
(stating that during the period between the coup and the 1983 elections, the MGK 
[National Security Council] wielded executive and legislative power with the intention 
of restructuring Turkish democracy). 
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thoroughly and the objectives of its drafters must be examined 
in detail.76 
D. The 1982 Constitution  
The drafters of the 1982 Constitution aimed to create an 
executive unaccountable to the TBMM (Turkish Grand National 
Assembly) and therefore civilian politics, with the expectation 
that the President would be heavily influenced by the military.77 
The 1982 Constitution accordingly provided the President with 
numerous powers, including the appointment of personnel in 
the judiciary and military, specifically in institutions including 
the Yüksek Öğretim Kurulu (“YÖK”) [Council of Higher 
Education], Hakimler Savcılar Yüksek Kurulu (“HSYK”) 
[Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors], the 
Constitutional Court, and the Turkish Armed Forces.78 Once 
again, the Constitution was drafted by Turkish elites, in contrast 
to the democratic process of negotiating, bargaining, and 
compromising among political parties.79 The changes 
implemented with the new constitution included the 
strengthening of the military’s presence in existing institutions, 
as well as in the creation of new institutions.80 These new 
institutions included YÖK, which oversees universities and 
appoints their rectors, and HSYK, which accepts judges and 
                                                                                                             
76. See infra note 77 and accompanying text (introducing the objectives of the 
1982 Constitution). 
77. See Chtena, supra note 62 (explaining that the 1982 Constitution guaranteed 
military prominence and influence with the executive). Moreover, the first president 
after the coup was the general who led it, Kenan Evren. See ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, 
supra note 34, at 21 (noting that Evern, the general who led the 1980 coup served as 
president until November 1989); see also Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası Nov. 7, 1982, 
arts. 7–9 (Turk.) (outlining the separation of powers). 
78. See ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 20, 22–23 (noting the rights 
provided to the MGK by the 1982 Constitution); see also AKŞİN, supra note 20, at 276 
(enumerating some of the powers granted to the President by the 1982 Constitution). 
79. See ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 21 (discussing the drafting 
process of the 1982 Constitution); see also BİLGİN, supra note 10, at 141 (describing the 
creation phase of the 1982 Constitution as a closed process with no public 
participation). 
80. See Yıldırımm, supra note 6 (observing that the changes adopted following the 
1980 military intervention allowed the military to be more active and effective 
politically); see, e.g., Capezza, supra note 30, at 13 (“The constitution of 1982 . . . 
prohibited contestation or constitutional review of the laws or decrees passed by the 
military when the republic was under its rule from 1980 until 1983.”). 
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public prosecutors into the legal profession and orders their 
appointments, transfers, authorizations, and dismissals.81  
Another critical change introduced by the 1982 
Constitution, which is still debated today, involves the 
constitutional powers and immunities granted to the military 
and the MGK [National Security Council].82 The 1982 
Constitution exempts from judicial review by the Constitutional 
Court decisions of the Supreme Military Council involving high-
level military appointments, promotions, and expulsions as well 
as laws and decrees passed by the MGK regime during and after 
the coup d’état.83 The 1982 Constitution also established the 
Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemesi (“DGM”) [State Security Courts], 
in order to prosecute crimes against ideological and 
philosophical constitutional principles.84 These courts were 
                                                                                                             
81. See, e.g., Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasasi Nov. 7, 1982, art. 130, 159 (Turk.) 
(establishing and discussing the functions of YÖK and HSYK); see ÖZBUDUN & 
GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 22 (discussing the new institutions established by the 1982 
Constitution). 
82. See ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 23 (discussing the privileges 
military personnel were provided with by the 1982 Constitution which were named 
“exit guarantees” such as exemption from the review of Court of Accounts, the High 
Board of Supervision, and the decisions of the Supreme Military Council); POLICY 
BRIEF, supra note 11, at 4 (noting that in the past thirty years, these privileges prevented 
the military officers, including the generals behind the 1980 Coup, from being 
prosecuted for the wrongdoings that took place during and after the coups); see, e.g., 
Tarık Işık, Darbecilere Son Darbe, RADİKAL (Aug. 7, 2011, 9:15), 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=1059118&
CategoryID=77 (illustrating that amendments to one of the constitutional articles that 
provided the military with a legal exit guarantee for their actions in the coups is 
currently being debated); see also Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasasi Nov. 7, 1982, art. 15 
(Turk.) (limiting the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms during times of war, 
mobilization, and martial law). The immunities that prevented members of the military 
from being prosecuted for their actions related to the coups was a highly controversial 
issue debated during the 2010 referendum. See, e.g., Işık, supra (illustrating that 
amendments to one of the constitutional articles that provided the military with a legal 
exit guarantee for their actions in the coups is currently being debated). 
83. See ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 23 (noting the exemptions the 
1982 Constitution provided); see also Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası July 20, 1961 art. 
136 (Turk.) (noting that following the 1971 Intervention, the 1973 amendments to 
Article 136 of the 1961 Constitution established the DGMs [State Security Courts]). 
The DGMs were established to try cases involving crimes against the security of the state 
and organized crime. See William Hale, Turkish Democracy in Travail: The Case of the State 
Security Courts, THE WORLD TODAY, 186–94 (1977) (discussing the establishment of 
DGMs). 
84. See BİLGİN, supra note 10, at 140 (discussing the creation of DGMs); see also 
Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası Nov. 7, 1982, art. 143 (Turk.) (establishing the DGMs). 
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granted special rules of criminal procedure that weakened due 
process protection, and, therefore, allowed the military to 
silence anti-secular voices in the society.85  
E. Military Intervention of 1997  
From 1983 to the mid-1990s, Prime Minister Turgut Özal 
led Turkey in a period of increased international engagement, 
applying for EU membership in 1987 and re-establishing 
diplomatic connections with Turkic nations and former Soviet 
states.86 The first amendments to the 1982 Constitution (“1987 
amendments”) were passed in this period, resulting in increased 
constitutional flexibility and greater public control over future 
constitutional amendments.87 
During the 1990s, Turkey suffered from political instability 
caused by short-lived coalition governments, and resulting in 
high inflation rates and the re-proliferation of Islamist voices in 
politics.88 A second wave of constitutional reforms was initiated 
                                                                                                             
85. See Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası Nov. 7, 1982, art. 143 (Turk.) (outlining 
the functions and composition of DGMs); see also Banani, supra note 31, at 123 
(explaining that because of State Security Courts’ special rules of procedure, the EU 
has pressured Turkey to either abolish the courts or to harmonize their procedures 
with other state and federal courts as well as with the European Convention on Human 
Rights); Hale, supra note 83, at 187 (noting that the DGMs exercised special 
jurisdiction over crimes covered by ninety-nine different articles of the Penal Code, 
which have been used mainly against the Islamist right wing, but also against leftists in 
order to protect Atatürk’s secularist reforms). 
86. See AKŞİN, supra note 20, at 287–88 (discussing the political changes under 
Prime Minister Turgut Özal, which included opening up Turkey’s international 
relations); see also Chtena, supra note 62 (noting that Özal was the first civilian to be 
elected as president); Sedat Laçiner, Turgut Özal Period in Turkish Foreign Policy: Özalism, 
2 USAK Y.B. INT’L POLS. & L. 14 (2009), available at http://www.turkishweekly.net/
article/333/turgut-ozal-period-in-turkish-foreign-policy-ozalism.html (“The most 
important development for Turkey in the post-Cold War was the emergence of the 
Turkic world . . . . [These Turkic peoples] were freed from 150 years of Russian 
rule . . . .”). 
87. See ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 32–33 (discussing the 1987 
amendments to the 1982 Constitution, which eased the process for making future 
constitutional changes). See generally Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasasi Nov. 7, 1982, 
amend. I (Turk.) (amended through 2010) (marking the first amendments to the 1982 
Constitution as those made in 1987). 
88. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 9 (noting the political 
instability during the 1990s); see also BİLGİN, supra note 10, at 142–43 (examining the 
setbacks in Turkish politics in the late 1990s, which led to the victory of an Islamist 
party). 
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in 1995.89 In the same year, the Islamist Refah Partisi (“RP”) 
[Welfare Party] received twenty-one percent of the votes, 
sufficient to allow its leader to form a coalition government and 
become the first Islamist prime minister of Turkey.90 The RP’s 
success shifted the political focus from constitutional 
democratization to the preservation of secularism, triggering a 
heightened military influence in Turkish politics, which 
culminated in another military intervention in February 1997.91 
Unlike the three previous coups d’état, the military did not take 
over the government, but rather conducted a “post-modern 
coup” by proposing an eighteen-article precaution package.92 
Under heavy military pressure, the RP’s leader, Necmettin 
Erbakan, peacefully resigned from his post, manifesting the 
progress of Turkish democratic forces since the last coup 
d’etat.93 A few months later the RP was banned for its anti-
secular activities.94 This intervention, however, did not slow 
down the political Islamists, who had formed a new party, Fazilet 
                                                                                                             
89. See BİLGİN, supra note 10, at 142 (noting the second wave of amendments); see 
also Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasasi Nov. 7, 1982 (Turk.) (amended 1995) (listing 
amendments to fourteen articles in 1995: Articles 33, 52, 53, 67, 68, 69, 75, 84, 85, 93, 
127, 135, 149, and 171). 
90. See AKŞİN , supra note 20, at 296 (discussing Refah Partisi’s (“RP”) success); see 
also Dokupil, supra note 16, at 109 (marking Erbakan as Turkey’s first Islamic prime 
minister). 
91. See AKŞİN, supra note 20, at 301 (noting the intervention that took place on 
February 28, 1997); See also BİLGİN, supra note 10, at 143 (noting the greater military 
influence on politics in 1997). 
92. See AKŞİN, supra note 20, at 301 (noting the eighteen-article precaution 
package proposed by the military to prevent against the fundamental Islamist 
government); see also Chtena, supra note 62 (quoting Stephen Kinzer, Pro-Islamic 
Premier Steps Down in Turkey Under Army Pressure, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1997 
(characterizing the 1997 military intervention as a “soft coup”). 
93. See Dokupil, supra note 16, at 117–19 (stating that the intervention resulted in 
the political ban in 1998 of RP and six of its deputies, including Erbakan, for carrying 
out anti-secular, pro-Islamist policies and, therefore, violating the  
Constitution); see also Chtena, supra note 62 (noting that Erbakan complied with the 
army directives by resigning). But cf. supra note 54 and accompanying text (stating that 
the 1960 Coup had ended with the execution of Prime Minister Menderes and other 
prominent politicians). 
94. See AKŞİN, supra note 20, at 303 (noting the decision to ban the RP on January 
16, 1998); see also ANAYASA MAHKEMESİ GEREKÇELİ KARAR REFAH PARTİSİ’NİN 
KAPATILMASI [Reasoned Decision of the Turkish Constitutional Court: Closing of the 
Welfare Party], Decision No. 1998/1, 1998, available at http://www.belgenet.com/
dava/rpdava_g01.html (indicating the RP closure decision by the Constitutional 
Court). 
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Partisi (“FP”) [Virtue Party], months before the ban.95 Yet, the 
FP joined its political party predecessors when the 
Constitutional Court held its Islamist agenda to be against the 
principle of secularism.96 Once again, this decision proved to be 
no obstacle for advocates of RP and FP, who shortly thereafter 
formed a new political party, the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi 
(“AKP”) [Justice and Development Party], under the leadership 
of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.97 
F. Justice and Development Party, 2002–Present 
In November 2002, the AKP received over thirty-four 
percent of the total votes and formed the first single-party 
government, headed by an Islamist political party, in Turkish 
history.98 Unlike the RP or the FP, the AKP abandoned the anti-
secular Islamic framework, and embraced a moderate 
“conservative” position.99 From his party’s inception, to its rise 
to power, Erdoğan proclaimed the AKP’s commitment to the 
EU accession process, the development and stabilization of 
                                                                                                             
95. See Capezza, supra note 30, at 20 (marking when Fazilet Partisi (“FP”) was 
formed as prior to the date the Welfare Party (“RP”) was banned); see also Dokupil, 
supra note 16, at 119 (arguing that the ban was anticipated, allowing the RP members 
to establish a new Islamic party in advance of the decision). 
96. See Dokupil, supra note 16, at 124 (discussing the banning of the FP); see also 
Capezza, supra note 30, at 20 (explaining that the FP was banned for having an 
unconstitutionally Islamist platform); see also ANAYASA MAHKEMESİ GEREKÇELİ KARAR 
FAZİLET PARTİSİ’NİN KAPATILMASI [Reasoned Decision of the Turkish Constitutional 
Court: Closing of the Virtue Party], Decision No. 2001/2, 2001, available at 
http://www.belgenet.com/arsiv/fazilet.html (reporting the FP closure decision by the 
Constitutional Court). 
97. See Capezza, supra note 30, at 20 (noting the founding of the AKP under 
Erdoğan); see, e.g., Dokupil, supra note 16, at 106 (exemplifying the new mayor 
Erdoğan’s anti-Kemalist acts, including a reading of the Quran at the opening of a city 
council meeting). 
98. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 9 (reporting the votes the 
AKP received in 2002); supra note 90 and accompanying text (designating Erbakan as 
the first Islamic prime minister in a coalition government). 
99. See Capezza, supra note 30, at 20 (describing Erdoğan as a skilled politician 
who moderated his party’s image); see also Dokupil, supra note 16, at 127 (stating that 
Erdoğan abandoned his former hard-line Islamist rhetoric in support of a secular 
Turkey); Menderes Çınar, The Militarization of Secular Opposition in Turkey; Report, 
INSIGHT TURKEY, Apr.–June 2010, at 109 (noting however that the AKP does not 
endorse Islamic modernism, the idea that Islam is a form of life that is compatible with 
modernity as well as democracy). 
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Turkey’s foreign relations, and economic reform.100 The AKP 
was able to attract voters from a broader political spectrum than 
the RP or the FP by drawing on the similarity between the EU 
membership requirements and the AKP’s democratization 
goals.101 Both agendas advocate the reduction of military 
influence in Turkish politics.102 Consequently, immediately after 
its rise to power in 2002, the AKP implemented a significant 
push toward Europeanization and democratization by passing 
numerous constitutional amendments.103 Following its second 
victory in general elections, the AKP engaged in the process of 
re-defining the notions of national identity and secularism.104 
The AKP’s democratic initiative allowed the party to downgrade 
the role of the military, which was further weakened by the 
Ergenekon cases, named after an alleged secret network that 
included academics, businessmen, journalists, military officers, 
and politicians who were accused of plotting a coup d’etat to 
overthrow the AKP government.105 Although it is argued that the 
                                                                                                             
100. See Ulusoy, supra note 48 (noting the AKP’s commitment to the EU-accession 
process). 
101. See Capezza, supra note 30, at 20 (noting that the AKP aimed to appeal to an 
audience larger than the “Islamist base”); Ulusoy, supra note 48 (stating that the AKP 
viewed the EU accession process and the EU’s priority of increasing the 
democratization of Turkey as being in line with their efforts to weaken military control 
in Turkish politics). 
102. See Ulusoy, supra note 48 (noting that the EU accession requirements gave 
the AKP the opportunity to weaken military control in Turkish politics); Ward, supra 
note 21, at 222 (“[T]he AKP has, in opposing Kemalism, actually assumed the essential 
plank of Atatürk’s European policy, to identify with it, and join it.”). 
103. See ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 73 (summarizing the AKP’s 
efforts to harmonize Turkish law with the 2001 and 2004 constitutional amendments as 
well as with EU legislation); see also Çınar, supra note 99, at 110 (emphasizing the 
democratization process the AKP implemented in its early years). 
104. See Ulusoy, supra note 48 (discussing the AKP’s victory for a second 
consecutive term); see also Çınar, supra note 99, at 2 (observing that the AKP represents 
“a very loose redefinition of secularism . . . that accommodates Islamic public visibility 
in Turkey”). 
105. See, e.g., General Işık Koşaner, Chief of the Turkish General Staff, 
Resignation Statement (July 29, 2011), available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424053111903520204576480440105206166.html (noting the extent of the 
arrests in a speech, observing that “[a]t the moment, 250 generals and admirals, 
officers, non-commissioned officers and special Gendarmerie sergeants, 173 of them 
on active duty and 77 of them about be retired, are in detention deprived of their 
freedom”); Rosemary Righter, Erdoğan 1, Atatürk 0, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 15, 2011, available 
at http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2011/08/07/turkey-s-military-resignations
-make-erdogan-even-stronger.html (“Turkey now tops the world in jailing its journalists, 
surpassing China and Iran. Nearly 70 are in prison, thousands more are under 
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evidence was insufficient to prove a widespread plot, Ergenekon 
prosecutions resulted in the arrest of numerous retired and 
active duty officers, severely damaging the prestigious role of the 
military as the protectors of the Turkish state.106 The Ergenekon 
cases allowed the AKP to gradually marginalize the military’s 
role in the political sphere, thus clearing a strong obstacle from 
its path toward enhanced democratization of political society.107 
Several months prior to the Ergenekon trials, in March 2008, 
Turkey’s chief prosecutor had initiated a case against the AKP 
seeking to ban the party for its “anti-secular” activities.108 This 
ban case was supported by the military.109 Some segments of 
Turkish society began to view the Ergenekon trials as the AKP’s 
response to this ban case.110 Unlike the RP and FP, the AKP was 
not banned.111 However, due to the fact that the party was a focal 
                                                                                                             
interrogation . . . .”); see Ulusoy, supra note 48 (noting that a number of retired and 
active duty officer were arrested under the Ergenekon case); see also Coups Away, supra 
note 73, at 2 (stating that the case is named after an alleged network of “rogue security 
officers, academics, journalists, and businessmen”). 
106. See Capezza, supra note 30, at 22 (noting that the Ergenekon prosecutions 
led to the arrest of hundreds of people); see also Ulusoy, supra note 48 (explaining how 
the Ergenekon cases damaged the prestigious role of the military in Turkey); Compare 
Coups Away, supra note 73 (arguing that the network was accused of conspiring to 
commit political violence and chaos in the country to justify a coup against the AKP), 
with Çınar, supra note 99 (distinguishing the Ergenekon case as an event that declared 
military interventions an illegal process that must be submitted to the rule of law). 
107. See Ulusoy, supra note 48 (describing the marginalization process of the 
military); see also BİLGİN, supra note 10, at 143–44 (noting that the reforms 
implemented between 2001 and 2004 were focused on eliminating military influence 
over politics). 
108. See ANAYASA MAHKEMESİ KARARI [Decision of the Turkish Constitutional 
Court:], Decision No. 2008/2, 2008, available at http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/
index.php?l=manage_karar&ref=show&action=karar&id=2611&content (indicating the 
Constitutional Court decision dismissing the ban case against the AKP initiated by the 
Chief Prosecutor, which resulted in a warning). See generally SETA FOUND. POL., ECON., 
& SOC. RES., THE CASE AGAINST THE JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY, (AKP PARTY) 
(2008), available at http://www.setav.org/ups/dosya/10343.pdf (summarizing the 
closure case against the AKP). 
109. See Coups Away, supra note 73 (arguing that the military implicitly supported 
the chief prosecutor initiating the ban of the AKP). See supra notes 26–27 and 
accompanying text (describing the business circles, the military and the judiciary as 
forming the secular nationalist stronghold of Turkish society). 
110. See Coups Away, supra note 73 (arguing that the AKP fought back after the 
military implicitly supported the ban case against the AKP); see also Ulusoy, supra note 
48 (considering the Ergenekon case as a “bold step[]” taken by the AKP in the realm of 
civilian-military relations after the closure case against the party). 
111. See ANAYASA MAHKEMESİ KARARI [Decision of the Turkish Constitutional 
Court], Decision No. 2008/2, 2008, available at http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/
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point of anti-secular activities, the Court issued a warning and 
fined the AKP in the amount of US$29 million.112 
Despite increasing criticism from some segments of society, 
the AKP’s victory in the July 2007 elections, with almost forty-
seven percent of the total votes, reaffirmed that a significant 
portion of Turkish society might favor the reevaluation of the 
secularist/Kemalist and pro-Western/pro-EU policies.113 
Nonetheless, the AKP further consolidated its power when its 
presidential nominee, Abdullah Gül, Erdoğan’s long-term 
comrade, was elected by an AKP-dominated TBMM in August 
2007.114 With this election, any possibility of presidential vetoes 
regarding the constitutionality of future AKP legislation, seemed 
to have been removed.115 Considering that almost all of the EU 
harmonization packages have been implemented under the AKP 
governments in the past nine years, a further study of recent 
Turkey-EU history is necessary to understand the AKP’s 
proposed changes and partially employed, including the 
constitutional reform package (“Package”) that led to the 
constitutional referendum of 2010.116 
                                                                                                             
index.php?l=manage_karar&ref=show&action=karar&id=2611&content (noting the 
Constitutional Court decision dismissing the ban case against the AKP); see also İHSAN 
DAĞI, SETA FOUND. FOR POLITICAL, ECON. AND SOC. RESEARCH, BRIEF NO: 19, POLICY 
BRIEF: AK PARTY SURVIVES CLOSURE CASE: WHAT IS NEXT? 1, 5–6 (Aug. 2008), available 
at http://www.setav.org/public/HaberDetay.aspx?Dil=tr&hid=7376&q=ak-party-
survives-closure-case-what-is-next (analyzing the closure case against the AKP and 
explaining the verdict). 
112. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 9 (noting the Constitutional 
Court’s decision to cut state funding for the AKP in half); see also Ulusoy, supra note 48 
(noting that this amount corresponds to half of the AKP’s state funding). 
113. See Dokupil, supra note 16, at 55 (arguing that the success of Islamist parties 
suggests that many Turks favor a reevlauation of secularism in Turkey); see Ulusoy, 
supra note 48 (stating that the AKP received 46.7% of the votes in the 2007 elections). 
114. See Capezza, supra note 30, at 22 (noting Gül’s appointment as the 2007 
presidential candidate for Erdoğan’s AKP party); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of 
State, supra note 9 (describing Gül’s election). 
115. See Capezza, supra note 30, at 22 (nothing that the creation of a strong 
unaccountable presidency is a common objective stipulated by the military in the 1982 
Constitution and the AKP in the reform package, both of which contemplated that the 
position would be filled with someone favorable, enabling each to influence the 
policies of the country); see, e.g., Late Reflections on Referendum, TURKISH DAILY NEWS, 
Oct. 17, 2007 (giving the example that, after Gül assumed office, the question of direct 
election of the president was submitted to popular vote). 
116. See supra note 100–02 and accompanying text (illustrating the congruence of 
EU requirements and AKP reform proposals); see also TOKTAŞ & KURT, supra note 55, at 
3 (“Turkey has already adopted nine EU harmonization packages . . . [m]ost of the 
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G. Turkey’s EU Application Process and Reforms under the AKP 
Turkey is the longest-standing candidate for membership in 
the EU.117 Its initial application to the European Economic 
Community (“EEC”), the first economic organization of 
European states, dates back to the 1950s.118 Turkey entered into 
a customs union agreement with the EEC in 1995 and was finally 
considered eligible for EU membership in 1999.119 This Section 
focuses on the most recent period of Turkish-European 
relations starting in 1999. 
After the EU formally declared Turkey’s candidacy, Turkey 
attempted to accelerate its efforts to meet the Copenhagen 
Criteria, the formal name for EU membership criteria.120 
Beginning with the Turkish National Programme for the 
Adoption of the Acquis (“NPAA”), in 2001, Turkey witnessed 
the most radical changes to its constitution since 1982.121 As a 
result of these reform efforts, the EU commenced formal 
                                                                                                             
reforms that have been implemented to date were initiated and conducted by the AKP 
government in the 2000s.”). See generally ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 49–
79 (listing the contents of constitutional amendments implemented between 2001 and 
2006). 
117. See Ward, supra note 21, at 208 (noting that Turkey is the longest-standing 
applicant to the EU); see also ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 81 (noting the 
historical character of Turkey’s application to join the EU). 
118. See Ward, supra note 21, at 208 (stating that the initial application for 
“association” with the European Economic Community was made in the early 1950s); 
see also AKŞİN, supra note 20, at 287 (noting that the official application for membership 
was made by Ozal in 1987). 
119. See AKŞİN, supra note 20, at 296 (noting that the customs agreement with the 
European Union was signed on March 6, 1995); see also Ward, supra note 21, at 208–09 
(summarizing the history of Turkey’s attempts at EU accession); ÖZBUDUN & 
GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 82 (discussing the development of Turkey’s EU candidacy 
during the 1990s). 
120. See ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 85 (discussing reforms needed 
for Turkey to meet the Copenhagen Criteria); see also Glossary Definition of Accession 
Criteria (Copenhagen Criteria), EUROPA.COM (Nov. 22, 2010), http://europa.eu/
legislation_summaries/glossary/accession_criteria_copenhague_en.htm (last visited 
Jan. 30, 2011) (listing the three criteria a new member state must meet to join the EU). 
121. See Banani, supra note 31, at 124 (discussing the adoption of the Turkish 
National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (“NPAA”)); see also BİLGİN, supra 
note 10, at 143–44 (noting the radical political and economic reforms adopted by 
Turkey after 2001 including the abolishment of the death penalty, adoption of equality 
of spouses, abolishment of DGMs and increase of civilian members of MGKs, 
prevention of torture and mistreatment, and restrictions on party closures). 
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accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005.122 While 
Turkey’s military had divided sentiments toward the EU 
accession process and questioned its consistency with the 
Kemalist ideology, the progress toward meeting the EU 
membership criteria during the first three years of AKP rule 
proved that the party was committed to joining the EU and had 
adopted the cause of European integration as its primary goal.123 
Nonetheless, the commonality between the reforms 
implemented for the EU accession process and for the AKP’s 
Anti-Kemalist, Islamist agenda raised suspicions in some 
segments of Turkish society regarding the AKP’s motivations.124 
While the AKP had initially presented itself as a moderate 
conservative party, with a heavily Islamist background, aiming to 
reinterpret Kemalism in Turkey, it has nonetheless proven itself 
to be the first party to achieve success in advancing Turkey’s 
path to joining the EU.125 Some scholars have noted the irony 
that the AKP has now subsumed Atatürk’s original intention of 
creating a European Turkey.126 
                                                                                                             
122. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 9 (listing key events in the 
history of Turkey’s attempted accession to the EU); see also Ward, supra note 21, at 210 
(noting that the projections of the Copenhagen Council in 2002 were that accession 
negotiations would commence with Turkey in December 2004, if the country met the 
Copenhagen Criteria). 
123. See, e.g., ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 73 (noting that six of the 
nine harmonization packages were promulgated under the AKP government); see 
Capezza, supra note 30, at 20 (observing that the AKP embraced the EU accession 
process). 
124. See Ward, supra note 21, at 222 (stating that the case for the EU is aligned 
with the anti-Kemalist case); see also Adrien Katherine Wing, International Law, 
Secularism, and the Islamic World, 24 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 407, 421 (2009) (defining the 
AKP as a group of politicians that are heavily Islamist, causing some secular Turks to 
fear a change in laws under the AKP government). 
125. See Ward, supra note 21, at 222 (discussing the AKP’s pursuit of toward the 
EU accession process); see, e.g., ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 73 (noting two 
thirds of the harmonization packages were affected under the AKP government). 
126. See Ward, supra note 21, at 222 (arguing that the AKP, by standing in 
opposition to Kemalism, in reality embraced Atatürk’s European policy); Press Release, 
U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 9, at 3 (suggesting that the current is rooted in a 
tradition of challenge to Kemalist principles). 
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II. REFERENDUM PROCESS, THE AMENDMENT PACKAGE, 
AND SEPTEMBER 12, 2010, RESULTS 
The AKP’s efforts to reform Turkish politics continued 
after 2005 when the party pushed for more radical changes to 
revise, if not replace, the amended 1982 Constitution with the 
2010 Reform Package, marking the latest reform attempt.127 Part 
II of this Comment introduces the articles amended in the 
Package, examines the referendum process and its results, and 
discusses the reactions to the results by Turkish society, domestic 
and foreign politicians, and the media. Specifically, Section A 
observes the developments with regard to constitutional 
amendments between 2007 and 2010, including the failed AKP 
attempt to draft a completely new constitution in 2007. Section 
B discusses the six-month period immediately prior to the 
referendum, beginning in March 2010, when the AKP 
announced its decision to propose an amendment package. 
Section C examines the amended articles and distinguishes the 
revisions made to the constitutional text. Finally, Section D 
presents the referendum results and the different statements 
and reviews made by Turkish and non-Turkish politicians and 
media. 
A. Amendments, 2007–2010  
Amending the 1982 Constitution is not a novel topic in 
Turkish politics.128 Following this propensity, a new constitution 
                                                                                                             
127. See Law No. 5982 of May 7, 2010, Resmi Gazete [R.G.] No. 27580 (May 13, 
2010) (Turk.) (providing the 2010 Reform Package (“Package”) with proposed 
amendments to the Turkish Constitution). An English translation of the Package is 
available at http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/BasınMusavirlik/haberler/constituional_
amendments.pdf. See generally Anayasa Değişiklik Paketini Anlama Kilavuzu [A Guide to 
Understanding the Constitutional Amendment Package] TURKISH ASIAN CTR. FOR 
STRATEGIC STUDIES (Aug. 2010) [hereinafter TASAM], available at 
http://www.tasam.org/Files/PDF/referandumkilavuz.pdf (listing and analyzing all of 
the changes proposed in the 2010 reform package and their consequences). 
128. See SETA FOUND. FOR POLITICAL, ECON., AND SOC. RESEARCH, SETA ANALİZ , 
2010’DA TÜRKİYE [SETA ANALYSIS, TURKEY IN 2010] 6, 48 (Jan. 2011), available at 
http://setav.org/ups/dosya/59657.pdf (noting that the Turkish public is not a 
stranger to referendum and constitutional changes and that there has been a 
consensus among the political parties and the public in support of a new, civil, and 
democratic constitution). See generally Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası Nov. 7, 1982 
(Turk.) (amended 2010) (indicating that between 1982 and 2010, the 1982 
Constitution was amended seventeen times in total). A version of the Constitution of 
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had long been on the AKP’s agenda and even more so after its 
re-election in 2007.129 Almost all of the propositions brought to 
the table by the AKP prior to the Package had been opposed by 
the former President, the military, the Constitutional Court, the 
main opposition party, the CHP, and certain segments of the 
public, who suspected that the AKP was motivated by a “hidden 
Islamist agenda” incompatible with the secular character of the 
Turkish state.130 The prospects of a new or amended 
constitution proposed by the AKP improved with the election of 
Abdullah Gül as the President of the Republic, an office that 
had been regarded as an instrument of checks and balances (in 
addition to the military) by the secular elite.131 In light of the 
Turkish president’s broad governmental appointment powers, 
the election of an AKP ally as President was viewed by this group 
as signifying the fall of a fundamental stronghold of the 
secularists and the rise of an even greater threat to Kemalist 
principles.132 
                                                                                                             
the Republic of Turkey, as amended since 1982, is available at 
http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1982ay.htm. 
129. See Jonathan Head, Why Turkey’s Constitutional Referendum Matters, BBC NEWS 
(Sep. 10, 2010, 10:42 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11263302?
print=true (noting that the AKP talked about amending the Constitution for a number 
of years, but, until the Package in 2010, it had not taken action); see also Erdogan Says to 
Start Work on New Constitution, ALARABIYA.NET (Sept. 12, 2010), 
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2010/09/13/119168.html (reporting Erdoğan’s 
statement of his party’s intent to start drafting a new constitution after the AKP was re-
elected in 2007). 
130. See ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 103 (indicating the secularists’ 
fear that an Islamist presidency would threaten the secular foundations of the country); 
see also Head, supra note 129 (discussing the uneasy sentiment of many secular Turks 
regarding Erdoğan’s government and handling of the Package). Turkish secularists 
consist mainly of elites and the well-educated upper classes in metropolitan areas. See 
supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
131. See Playing Safe, ECONOMIST, Apr. 25, 2007 (noting that Abdullah Gül is the 
AKP’s candidate for presidency and if elected, Gül can be expected to endorse the AKP 
government’s strategies); ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 103 (describing the 
Office of the President as a mechanism of checks and balances that state elites may 
exercise over the President). See generally supra note 114 and accompanying text 
(discussing Gül’s appointment to the presidency). 
132. See ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 103 (indicating that, in the past, 
the presidential powers granted by the Constitution, similar to those granted to the 
military, enabled the President to interfere and prevent an Islamist party from 
implementing laws that would strip away the secularist character of the Constitution, 
the judicial system, and the universities); see, e.g., Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasasi Nov. 
7, 1982, amend. XVI (Turk.) (stipulating that all Constitutional Court members be 
elected by the president). 
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In early 2007, the AKP began the process of drafting a new 
constitution.133 Although the proposed constitution seemed to 
serve democracy and liberalism far more than the 1982 
Constitution, it was heavily criticized by the same segments of 
the Turkish public.134 Before the draft constitution was 
announced, it was leaked to the media, leading to a firm 
opposition from members of the military-civilian bureaucracy 
and, therefore, the postponement of the campaign to reform 
the Constitution.135 
B. Referendum Process, March–September 2010 
In late March 2010, the AKP announced the reform 
Package.136 Twenty-six amendments were approved by the 
TBMM on May 7, 2010, clearing the Package’s path to the 
president’s signature and popular vote.137 Yet the two opposition 
parties contested the constitutionality of the Package, requesting 
its annulment for violating the secularism principle in the 
                                                                                                             
133. See ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 104–05 (indicating that in June 
2007, Erdoğan requested that several constitutional law professors draft a new 
constitution); see also POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 3 (noting that Erdoğan asked a 
group of law professors, headed by Ergun Özbudun, to prepare a new draft 
constitution). 
134. See POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 3 (“[T]he draft constitution was more 
democratic and liberal than the present Turkish Constitution.”); see also ÖZBUDUN & 
GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 105 (noting that the draft was not welcomed by those 
fearing the AKP’s hidden Islamist agenda); supra note 130 and accompanying text 
(describing the secularist groups opposing the AKP). 
135. See ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 105 (noting that the AKP’s 
original intent had been to foster a broad public debate before the draft would be 
presented to the TBMM, followed by a referendum); see also POLICY BRIEF, supra note 
11, at 3 (noting that the draft of the Constitution was leaked to the media prior to it 
becoming public and that strict public opposition formed immediately thereafter). 
136. See Law No. 5982 of May 7, 2010, Resmi Gazete [R.G.] No. 27580 (May 13, 
2010) (Turk.) (presenting the twenty-six article reform package); see also Paşalara Yüce 
Divan Yolu, MILLIYET.COM.TR (Mar. 30, 2010), http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Siyaset/
HaberDetay.aspx?aType=HaberDetay&ArticleID=1218095&Date=29.01.2011&Kategori=
siyaset&b=Pasalara%20Yuce%20Divan%20yolu (discussing the content of the two 
articles added to the package at the last minute). 
137. See Turkey’s Parliament Clears Way for Constitution Referendum, EURACTIV.COM 
(May 7, 2010) [hereinafter Turkey’s Parliament], http://www.euractiv.com/
enlargement/turkeys-parliament-clears-way-referendum-news-493906 (reporting the 
TBMM voting process and approval of the amendment package); POLICY BRIEF, supra 
note 11, at 4 (stating that in order for a bill to become law in the Turkish parliament, 
two-thirds of the deputies, 367 out of 550 votes, must vote in the affirmative, whereas a 
minimum of 330 votes are sufficient to put the bill to a referendum). 
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Constitution.138 In less than two months, on July 7, 2010, the 
Court announced its decision to approve most of the 
amendments, annulling only the procedures regarding the 
nomination of members to the Constitutional Court and to the 
HSYK (Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors).139 
This decision allowed the Package to move toward referendum 
on September 12, 2010.140 
C. The Amendment Package 
The Package consisted of twenty-six amendments that can 
be grouped into two parts: reforms regarding fundamental 
rights and freedoms (Articles 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 23) and those 
concerning the reorganization of the judiciary (Articles 11 and 
14–22).141 The following sections will discuss certain 
amendments proposed in the Package. 
1. Article 1: Equality before the Law 
Article 1 of the Package seeks to revise Article 10 of the pre-
amendment 1982 Constitution concerning equality of all 
citizens before the law.142 This article was proposed to conform 
                                                                                                             
138. See POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 4 (noting the annulment case initiated by 
the two main opposition parties); see also Court Ruling Throws Turkey into Pre-Election 
Mode, THE DAILY STAR, July 9, 2010, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/
Jul/09/Court-ruling-throws-Turkey-into-pre-election-mode.ashx#axzz1cu0WwFZO 
(“Opponents see the reforms as a government attempt to . . . undermine Turkey’s 
secular principles. . . . The opposition had asked the entire package to be thrown 
out.”). 
139. See POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 4 (stating that the Court amended the 
content of two main articles (Articles 146 and 159), and two related, provisional articles 
(Articles 18 and 19) regarding the organization of the Constitutional Court and 
HSYK); see also Dan Bilefsky & Sebnem Arsu, Turkish Court Rejects Parts of Constitution 
Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2010, at A9 (announcing the Court’s partial rejection of 
the reform package). 
140. See Turkey’s Parliament, supra note 137 (discussing the path of the Package 
toward a referendum); see also POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 4 (noting the date for the 
referendum). 
141. See POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 5–6 (grouping the Package into two 
categories). See generally Law No. 5982 of May 7, 2010, Resmi Gazete [R.G.] No. 27580 
(May 13, 2010) (Turk.) (listing the amendments in the Package). 
142. Law No. 5982, art. 1 (noting the amendment to Article 10 in its original 
language); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 9 (explaining, in an English translation, that 
the following phrases were added to the text of the Constitution: “The measures to be 
taken to this end [equality between men and women] shall not be interpreted as 
against the principle of equality. The measures taken for children, elderly, disabled 
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Turkey’s constitution with the EU’s Charter on Fundamental 
Rights and aims to create a foundation in the Constitution for 
positive discrimination, favoring citizens in need of special 
protection, including children, the elderly, disabled people, 
widows, invalids, veterans, and orphans of martyrs.143 
2. Article 6: Right of Collective Bargaining 
Article 6 of the Package revises Article 53 of the pre-
amendment 1982 Constitution regarding the right of collective 
bargaining and grants union rights to civil servants allowing 
them to engage in collective bargaining.144 The consolidated 
version proposes: “Civil servants and other public officials have 
the right to conclude collective agreement[s] . . . [and i]n case 
of disputes, . . . appeal to the Conciliation Board of Public 
Servants, [decisions of which] shall be decisive and in the force 
of collective agreement.”145 In addition, the changes allow 
provisions of collective agreements to be reflected on 
pensioners.146 
                                                                                                             
people, widows and orphans of martyrs as well as for invalid and veterans shall not be 
considered as against the principle of equality”). 
143. Law No. 5982, art. 1 (noting the amendment to Article 10 in its original 
language); see POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 5, 9 (stating that the “article was 
reformulated in light of EU’s Charter on Fundamental Rights;” and explaining that:  
Men and women have equal rights. The State shall have the 
obligation to ensure that this equality exists in practice. The 
measures to be taken for children, elderly, disabled people, widows 
and orphans of martyrs as well as for invalids and veterans shall not 
be considered as against the principle of equality. 
See generally ENSAROĞLU supra note 60, at 8–11 (analyzing the amendment to Article 10 
within the context of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). 
144. Law No. 5982, art. 6 (removing the third and fourth paragraphs from the 
53rd Article of the Constitution, but adding in part that civil servants and other public 
officials have the right of collective bargaining); see ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, at 21–22 
(discussing the amendment to Article 53 within the context of international human 
rights and democratization). 
145. Law No. 5982, art. 6 (noting the amendment to Article 53 in its original 
language); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 11 (comparing a translated version of the 
language of Article 53 in the 1982 Constitution to the proposed change in the 
Package). 
146. Law No. 5982, art. 6 (noting the amendment to Article 53 in its original 
language); see POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 11 (translating into English the textual 
changes proposed by the Package to Article 53 of the 1982 Constitution: “reflection of 
the provisions of collective agreement on the pensioners . . . shall be regulated by 
law”). 
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3. Article 7: Right to Strike and Lockout 
Article 7 of the Package repeals the third and seventh 
paragraphs of Article 54 of the Constitution regarding the right 
to strike and lockout.147 The repealed portions held labor 
unions liable for any damage caused in a work place during 
strikes and prohibited “politically motivated strikes and 
lockouts, solidarity strikes and lockouts, occupation of work 
premises, labour go-slows, and other forms of obstruction.”148 
With this change, Article 54 brings union rights in Turkey closer 
to the human rights standards of developed democracies.149 
4. Article 8: Right to Petition, Right to Information and Appeal 
to the Ombudsman 
 Article 8 of the Package revises Article 74 of the pre-
amendment 1982 Constitution regarding the right to petition.150 
The title of Article 74 is changed in the proposal, translated to 
mean “Right to Petition, Right to Information, and Appeal to 
                                                                                                             
147. Law No. 5982, art. 7 (proposing changes to Article 54); see POLICY BRIEF, 
supra note 11, at 12 (comparing the language of Article 54 in the 1982 Constitution 
regarding the right to strike and lockout to the proposed language in the Package). 
148. See Law No. 5982, art. 7 (noting the language proposed for removal in its 
original language); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 12 (comparing an English 
translation of the language of Article 54 in the 1982 Constitution to the proposed 
change in the Package); see ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, at 23 (noting that the Package 
removes many of the prohibitions regarding general and politically motivated strikes 
and lockouts, which were introduced by the 1980 Coup in the 1982 Constitution). Go-
slows, or slowdowns, are industrial actions where employees work more slowly to 
persuade an employer to agree to higher pay or better working conditions. CAMBRIDGE 
DICTIONARIES ONLINE, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/go-slow 
(last visited Nov. 14, 2011). 
149. See POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 12 (comparing an English translation of 
the language of Article 54 in the 1982 Constitution regarding the right to strike and 
lockout to the proposed language in the Package); see also ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, 
at 23 (noting that the Package removes many of the prohibitions regarding general and 
politically motivated strikes and lockouts, which were introduced by the 1980 Coup in 
the 1982 Constitution and arguing that general and politically motivated strikes and 
lockouts are considered part of human rights in developed democracies).  
150. Law No. 5982, art. 8 (providing the four paragraphs added to Article 74 
concerning the right to petition and the establishment of the Ombudsman Office); 
POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 13 (comparing the language of Article 74 in the 1982 
Constitution, translated into English, to the language offered by the Package, including 
the new language regarding the Ombudsman). 
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the Ombudsman,” and four paragraphs have been added.151 
The only change regarding the right to information and appeal 
is in the third paragraph, which states: “Everyone has the right 
to information and apply to ombudsman [sic].”152 The revisions 
to Article 74 are especially significant because they establish an 
independent ombudsman to investigate and review the actions 
of the administration and their conformity with the law.153 
Institutions such as the Ombudsman Office, which are 
independent from the administrative and legislative bodies, have 
been welcomed and supported by the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee.154 The additions propose that the 
Ombudsman’s Office be subordinate to the TBMM Presidency 
and that the Chief Ombudsman be elected for four year terms 
by the TBMM.155  
                                                                                                             
151. Law No. 5982, art. 8 (providing the changes made to Article 74); see POLICY 
BRIEF, supra note 11, at 13 (noting in English the differences between the Constitution 
and the Package proposal, including the consolidated title of the Article: “Right to 
Petition, Right to Information and Appeal to the Ombudsman”). 
152. See Law No. 5982, art. 8 (providing the changes made to Article 74 in 
Turkish); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 13 (noting that, as translated in English, the 
phrase “The way of exercising this right shall be determined by law” in the Constitution 
is replaced by “[e]veryone has the right to information and apply to ombudsman 
[sic].” The remaining changes are regarding the organization and functions of the 
Ombudsman Office.); ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, at 26 (describing the right to 
information as an important component of freedom of expression). 
153. See Law No. 5982, art. 8 (noting the amendment to Article 74 in its original 
language); see also POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 6 (“Everyone has the right to 
information and [to] apply to [the] Ombudsman.”); ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, at 26 
(discussing the benefits of the Ombudsman Office). 
154. See ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, at 26 (stating that the United National 
Human Rights Committee has been very supportive of institutions that are established 
by governments but function independently). See generally TASAM, supra note 127 
(depicting the Ombudsman structure in numerous European states, which sets forth 
that the Ombudsman be elected by the Parliament and arguing that the term of office 
set forth in the Package should be twelve years). 
155. See Law No. 5982, art. 8 (noting the amendment to Article 74 in its original 
language); see also POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 13 (“The Ombudsman Office 
established subordinate to the Presidency of the Turkish Grand National Assembly 
investigates the complaints related with the operation of the administration.”); 
TASAM, supra note 127 (noting that the Ombudsman’s term of office is matched to the 
new legislative year, which constitutes an obstacle for a completely independent 
Ombudsman Office. In addition, unlike in European states, where the Ombudsman 
undertakes investigations on behalf of the Parliament, the proposed language 
subordinates the Ombudsman Office to the TBMM Presidency.). 
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5. Article 9: TBMM Membership 
Article 9 of the Package removes the last paragraph of 
Article 84 in the pre-amendment 1982 Constitution, which 
effects the termination of membership of deputies in the 
TBMM.156 The amendment repeals the deprivation of 
membership for deputies whose actions resulted in the closure 
of their parties, rendering this provision consistent with the 
European Convention on Human Rights (“Convention”) and 
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
(“ECHR”).157 The deleted portion from the amended 1982 
Constitution called for the termination of the “membership of a 
deputy whose statements and acts are cited in a final judgment 
by the Constitutional Court as having caused the permanent 
dissolution of his party.”158 Even though general statements and 
actions by TBMM members are protected under legislative non-
liability, the Constitutional Court has in the past repeatedly 
                                                                                                             
156. Law No. 5982, art. 9 (indicating the amended version of Article 84, which 
removed a stipulation from the 1982 Constitution that rescinded a deputy’s 
membership in the TBMM if his statements and acts were cited in a final judgment by 
the Constitutional Court as having caused the permanent dissolution of his party); see 
POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 5, 14 (comparing the pre-amendment language of 
Article 84 to the one proposed in the Package). 
157. See Law No. 5982, art. 9 (indicating the language that would be repealed 
from Article 84 of the 1982 Constitution); see also POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 6 
(“The revision to Article 84 repeals the deprivation of MP status for those whose 
actions lead to the closure of their parties.”); ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, at 32 (stating 
that the existing language of Article 84 is inconsistent with international human rights 
law). In the past, the ECHR has repeatedly decided that the regulations in the Turkish 
Constitution regarding political bans and loss of TBMM membership violate Article 3 
of the Protocol No. 1 of the Convention concerning the right to elect and be elected. 
ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, at 32. See generally Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 11, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (depicting 
the standards for freedom of assembly and association); Protocol No. 1 to the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 3, 
Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262 (agreeing to the right to free elections that ensures the 
free expression of opinion in the contracting states). 
158. Law No. 5982, art. 9 (providing the proposed language to be removed from 
Article 84); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 16 (comparing the language of Article 125 
in the 1982 Constitution, as it would be if translated into English, to the amended one 
proposed in the 2010 Package). But see TASAM, supra note 127 (arguing that the 
revisions are pointless as Article 84 in the 1982 Constitution already avails TBMM 
members of the benefits of legislative non-liability for their statements and waives them 
of criminal and statutory prosecution). 
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based its ban decisions on the statements and sanctions of 
TBMM members of that party.159 
6. Article 11: Recourse to Judicial Review 
Article 11 of the Package revises Article 125 of the pre-
amendment 1982 Constitution.160 Together with the changes 
made to Articles 145, 156, and 157, these changes aim to reform 
the military judiciary.161 The changes suggested in Article 11 
would make the decisions of Yüksek Askeri Şura (“YAŞ”) 
[Supreme Military Council] regarding the expulsion of military 
officers from the Turkish Armed Forces subject to judicial 
review.162 Nevertheless, the new draft makes no exception for 
YAŞ decisions concerning promotion procedures and 
retirement due to a shortage of cadres.163 Another change in 
Article 125 is in the fourth paragraph where the consolidated 
version adds the following: “Judicial power shall be limited to 
control of the lawfulness of administrative actions and 
                                                                                                             
159. See TASAM, supra note 127 (noting that prosecuting a political party for the 
statements or actions of its members has been used as a basis in political party ban 
decisions in Turkey, a practice that is not sanctioned under international human rights 
law); see, e.g., supra note 96 (quoting the Constitutional Court decision regarding the 
closure of the FP [Virtue Party], which was based on the acts and statements of some of 
its members). 
160. Law No. 5982, art. 11 (providing the language added to Article 125 in the 
amendment package regarding recourse to judicial review); see POLICY BRIEF, supra 
note 11, at 8 (“According to amended Article 125, judicial remedies will be available 
against the decisions of the Supreme Military Council regarding discharges of any kind, 
except for decisions regarding promotion procedures and retirement due to shortage 
of cadres.”). 
161. See Law No. 5982, arts. 11, 15, 20, 21 (providing the changes made to Article 
125, 145, 156, and 157 regarding military courts); TASAM, supra note 127 (analyzing 
each article amended in the 2010 reform package). 
162. See Law No. 5982, art. 11 (providing proposed changes to Article 125 
regarding judicial remedies against certain decisions made by Yüksek Askeri Şura 
(“YAŞ”)); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 16 (noting the contrast between the language 
of Article 125 in the 1982 Constitution and the reform offered regarding this article in 
the Package). 
163. See Law No. 5982, art. 11 (noting the language of amended Article 125, 
which makes an exception for YAŞ decisions concerning certain promotions and 
retirements); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 16 (translating into English and providing 
a comparison between the language in the 1982 Constitution and the Package). 
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procedures and shall under no circumstance be used as the 
control of expediency.”164 
7. Article 14: Judicial Oversight 
Article 14 of the Package completely modifies Article 144 of 
the pre-amendment 1982 Constitution regarding the supervision 
of judges and public prosecutors.165 It renames Article 144 “The 
Inspection of the Judicial Services” and proposes that the public 
prosecutors proceed in the following way: “The inspection of 
judicial services and the administrative duties of public 
prosecutors by the Ministry of Justice shall be conducted by 
judicial inspectors and internal auditors, who should be a judge 
or a prosecutor by profession. Whereas examination, inquiry, 
and investigation procedures shall be conducted by judicial 
inspectors.”166 
8. Article 15: Military Justice 
Article 15 of the Package revises Article 145 of the pre-
amendment 1982 Constitution regarding military justice.167 The 
powers granted to military justice have been modified by each 
Turkish Constitution.168 Under the 1961 Constitution the 
jurisdiction of military justice was broadened and the Military 
Court of Cassation was established as the final reviewing 
                                                                                                             
164. Law No. 5982, art. 11 (reflecting the amended language of Article 125); see 
also POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 16 (illustrating the English translation of Article 
125’s original and amended version). 
165. Law No. 5982, art. 14 (providing a completely revised Article 144 of the 1982 
Constitution); see POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 7 (translating Article 14 of the 
Package into English: “With the proposals on Article 144 and 159, the composition and 
the expansion of the HCJP [High Council for Judges and Public Prosecutors] are 
restructured to include a broader representation of judicial officials”). 
166. Law No. 5982, art. 14 (reflecting the amended language of Article 144); see 
also POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 18 (illustrating the English translation of Article 
144’s original and amended version). 
167. Law No. 5982, art. 15 (stating the language of amended Article 145 including 
the three revised paragraphs regarding the jurisdiction of military justice); see POLICY 
BRIEF, supra note 11, at 7 (summarizing the revisions to military justice, which included 
amendments to Articles 125, 145, 156, and 157). 
168. See Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası July 20, 1961, art. 141 (Turk.) (providing 
the Turkish version of Article 141, which established the Military Court of Cassation 
and noting that it was amended in 1971); see also ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, at 42 
(noting that the Military Court of Cassation was established by Article 141 in the 1961 
Constitution, which was amended in 1971 after the second coup). 
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authority for decisions made by military courts and certain 
decisions in state courts rendered against military officials.169 
The 1971 amendments added the High Military Administrative 
Court of Appeals to military courts as a parallel to the civilian 
Council of State, which created a dual court system inconsistent 
with the principles of a democratic constitutional state.170 The 
1982 Constitution strengthened the authority of military courts 
and expanded the jurisdiction of the High Military 
Administrative Court of Appeals.171 
The revision to Article 145, envisages limitations on the 
expanded jurisdiction of military courts to try military personnel 
only for military offenses.172 The new draft, while continuing to 
grant jurisdiction to military courts to “handle cases regarding 
military offences committed by military personnel and offences 
committed by military personnel against military personnel or 
related to their military services or duties,” stipulates that 
military personnel’s “offences against the security of the state, 
constitutional order and the functioning of this order shall be 
handled in judicial courts.”173 In addition, the new draft removes 
                                                                                                             
169. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (discussing the establishment of the 
Military Court of Cassation in the 1961 Constitution and the increasing power of 
military justice in the following constitutions); see also ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, at 42 
(stating that the 1971 amendments established the High Military Administrative Court 
of Appeals). 
170. See ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, at 42 (providing the historical context of 
military justice, specifically the dual court system created by the 1961 Constitution and 
1971 amendments and noting that the expansion of military jurisdiction to the 
detriment of the judiciary led to the adjudication of military personnel and civilians in 
different court systems.); see also POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 7 (comparing the pre-
amendment language of Article 145 to the revised text). 
171. See Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası Nov. 7, 1982, arts. 145, 156–157 (Turk.) 
(showing how the 1982 Constitution amended the articles regarding military justice); 
see also ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, at 42 (providing the constitutional context of 
military justice in the 1961 and 1982 Constitutions and 1971 amendments). The 
existence of a military justice system is problematic in terms of human rights and 
democracy. In constitutional states (states of law), civilians cannot be heard in military 
courts and military court decisions must be reviewed by civilian high courts. See 
ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, at 42.  
172. See Law No. 5982, art. 15 (noting the language of amended Article 145); see 
also POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 7 (“The amended Article 145 limits the competence 
of the military judiciary to the handling of military offences.”). 
173. Law No. 5982, art. 15 (reflecting the amended language of Article 145); 
POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 18 (illustrating the English translation of Article 145’s 
original and amended version); see ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, at 43 (stating that the 
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the term, “in military places.”174 Finally, the last sentence in the 
article concerning the “[r]elations between military judges and 
the office of commander . . . regarding the requirements of 
military service apart from judicial functions, shall also be 
prescribed by law” is no longer in the text.175 
The new draft removes the term, “or under martial law” 
from the list in the second paragraph, which stipulates that the 
organization of “offenses and persons falling within the 
jurisdiction of military courts in time of war” and “the 
appointment of judges and public prosecutors from judicial 
courts to military courts shall be regulated by law.”176 Whereas 
the pre-amendment 1982 Constitution allowed non-military 
persons to be tried in military courts in times of war or under 
martial law, the consolidated version of the article limits this 
only to times of war.177 
9. Article 16: Organization of the Constitutional Court 
Article 16 of the Package revises Article 146 of the pre-
amendment 1982 Constitution regarding the size and 
                                                                                                             
amendments in Article 145 provide the adjudication in state courts for offences against 
the security of the state, constitutional order and the functioning of this order). 
174. Law No. 5982, art. 15 (noting the language of amended Article 145 in 
Turkish); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 18 (delineating the differences between 
Article 145 of the 1982 Constitution and the Package in an English translation); see 
ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, at 43 (arguing that by removing “in military places” the 
revisions further restrict the military courts’ jurisdiction). 
175. Law No. 5982, art. 15 (noting the language of amended Article 145 in 
Turkish); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 18 (illustrating the English translation of 
Article 145’s original and amended version. “The amended Article 145 limits the 
competence of the military judiciary to the handling of military offences.”). 
176. Law No. 5982, art. 15 (noting the language of amended Article 145 in 
Turkish); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 18 (providing the language that has been 
removed from the 1982 Constitution); see ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, at 42 (stating that 
the amended Article 145 as proposed in the Package limits the jurisdiction of military 
courts); TASAM, supra note 127 (noting the consequences of martial law with regards 
to shift in powers from civilian to military bureaucracy and the adjudication of offenses 
in relation to the reasons of martial law by military courts).  
177. See Law No. 5982, art. 15 (noting the language of amended Article 145 in 
Turkish); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 18 (“Non-military persons shall not be tried in 
military courts excluding the state of war.”). According to the pre-amendment 
constitution, civilians can be tried in military courts in times of martial law. See TASAM, 
supra note 127.  
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membership of the Constitutional Court.178 The 1982 
Constitution stipulated an eleven-member Constitutional Court, 
whose membership would be decided directly or indirectly by 
presidential appointment.179 The revisions put forward in Article 
16 of the Package would increase the membership of the 
Constitutional Court to seventeen members, and permit the 
TBMM to elect three of those members.180 Furthermore, the 
proposal regulates the appointments to the Court made by the 
President, while requiring two such appointments to be made 
from among military court judges.181 Moreover, Article 16 sets 
the minimum age requirement for Constitutional Court 
members at forty-five, increases the experience requirement for 
category one judges and prosecutors from fifteen to twenty years 
and makes way for court rapporteurs to become Constitutional 
Court members.182 
10. Article 17: Constitutional Court Membership 
Article 17 of the Package amends Article 147 of the pre-
amendment 1982 Constitution, which discusses the termination 
                                                                                                             
178. Law No. 5982, art. 16 (stipulating the five paragraphs added to amended 
Article 146 in the Package); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 19 (comparing the 
language of Article 146 in the 1982 Constitution to the one in the Package). 
179. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasasi Nov. 7, 1982, art. 146 (Turk.) (stipulating an 
eleven-member Constitutional Court); see Law No. 5982, art. 16 (providing the 
consolidated version of Article 146 in the Package, which requires a [seventeen]-
member Constitutional Court). 
180. Law No. 5982, art. 16 (providing the consolidated version of Article 146 
which requires a seventeen-member Constitutional Court); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 
11, at 19 (“The Constitutional Court shall be composed of seventeen members.”); 
ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, at 45 (arguing that in democratic states political powers and 
parliaments play a significant role in the election of Constitutional Court members). 
The 1961 Constitution allowed the TBMM to elect Constitutional Court members, an 
authority that was taken away by the changes implemented after the 1971 Coup. See 
ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, at 45. 
181. See Law No. 5982, art. 16 (providing the consolidated version of Article 146 
which sets forth the organization of the Constitutional Court); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 
11, at 19 (providing in English the newly added language regarding the appointment 
of Constitutional Court members by the TBMM and the President). 
182. Law No. 5982, art. 16 (providing the consolidated version of Article 146 
which sets forth the age and experience requirements for the Court members); see 
ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, at 44 (noting the radical changes to the organization of the 
Constitutional Court). 
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of Constitutional Court membership.183 The additions to Article 
147 introduce a limited term of office for the Constitutional 
Court: “[t]he members of the Constitutional Court . . . [shall] 
be elected for a term of twelve years. A member shall not be re-
elected.”184 In addition, the proposed version maintains the 
retirement age of sixty-five as stipulated in the pre-amendment 
1982 Constitution.185 “The appointment of the members to 
another office whose term of office expires prior to their 
mandatory age of retirement and matters regarding their 
personal rights shall be laid down in law.”186 
11. Article 18: Functions and Powers of the Constitutional Court 
Article 18 of the Package revises Article 148 of the pre-
amendment 1982 Constitution regarding the functions and 
powers of the Constitutional Court.187 The revisions to Article 
148 introduce the right of individuals to apply to the 
Constitutional Court, allow the Court to act as the Supreme 
Court, and pave the way for appeals of decisions made by the 
Court while acting in its capacity as the Supreme Court.188 
                                                                                                             
183. Law No. 5982, art. 17 (noting the additions to amended Article 147 including 
the language regarding the term of office of Constitutional Court members); POLICY 
BRIEF, supra note 11, at 20 (comparing, in an English translation, Article 147 of the 
1982 Constitution to the suggested language in Article 17 of the Package). 
184. Law No. 5982, art. 17 (providing the consolidated version of Article 147 
which sets forth the term of office of Constitutional Court members and the 
termination of their memberships); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 20 (comparing 
Article 147 of the pre-amendment 1982 Constitution to the suggested language in 
Article 17 of the Package); see TASAM, supra note 127 (arguing that twelve years are 
sufficient for a judge to gain experience and at the same time allow the Court to reflect 
social changes in its profile and stipulating that in many European courts the term of 
office for judges is between nine to twelve years). 
185. Law No. 5982, art. 17 (reflecting the suggested language of Article 147 as 
proposed in the Package, in Turkish); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 20 (stating in 
English the suggested change to Article 147 of the 1982 Constitution: “[t]he members 
of the Constitutional Court shall retire on reaching the age of sixty-five”). 
186. Law No. 5982, art. 17 (providing the consolidated version of Article 147, 
which sets forth the term of office of Constitutional Court members); POLICY BRIEF, 
supra note 11, at 20 (comparing, in English, Article 147 of the pre-amendment 1982 
Constitution to the suggested language in Article 17 of the Package). 
187. Law No. 5982, art. 18 (noting the additions to amended Article 148 
regarding the functions and powers of the Constitutional Court); POLICY BRIEF, supra 
note 11, at 20–21 (comparing the language of Article 148 in the 1982 Constitution to 
the amended language, as translated). 
188. See Law No. 5982, art. 18 (noting the revisions made to Article 148 of the 
1982 Constitution including applications to the Constitutional Court ); POLICY BRIEF, 
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According to the third paragraph of the amended version of 
Article 148, “[a]nyone, who claims that any of their fundamental 
rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and 
falling under the European Convention of Human Rights has 
been violated by the public authorities, can apply to the 
Constitutional Court.”189 Nevertheless, the consolidated version 
requires the individual to have exhausted “all ordinary legal 
remedies” prior to bringing his claim before the Court.190 A 
critical change in the new version of the article allows “[t]he 
Chief of Staff, the commanders of the Land, Air, Naval and 
Gendarmerie Forces . . . [to] be tried before the Supreme Court 
for their offences related to their duties.”191 In such an event, 
the Constitutional Court shall act in its capacity as the Supreme 
Court.192 Prior to the Package such cases were adjudicated in 
Military Court of Cassation.193 
Another revision introduced under the revised version of 
Article 148 pertains to the judicial review of the decisions made 
                                                                                                             
supra note 11, at 6 (providing a translation of the proposal in Article 18 of the Package: 
“With the amendment to Article 148, the rights of individual recourse to the 
Constitutional Court is introduced. . . . [Military commanders] can be tried for 
offences related to their duties by the Constitutional Court in its capacity as the 
Supreme Court”). 
189. Law No. 5982, art. 18 (indicating the addition to Article 148); POLICY BRIEF, 
supra note 11, at 20 (comparing the pre-amendment language of Article 148 to the 
suggested version in the Package, in English). 
190. Law No. 5982, art. 18 (reflecting the changes to Article 148 in Turkish); 
POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 20 (comparing in English the pre-amendment language 
of Article 148 to the suggested version in the Package). 
191. Law No. 5982, art. 18 (stipulating amendments to Article 148); POLICY BRIEF, 
supra note 11, at 20 (reflecting a translation of the additional paragraph suggested in 
the Package regarding the trial of military commanders for offences related to their 
duties); see ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, at 47 (stating that the existing legislation lacked 
to regulate the adjudication of the TBMM President, the Chief of Staff, the 
commanders of Land, Air, Naval, and Gendarmerie Forces for their offences related to 
their duties). This Article removes the uncertainty and grants the Constitutional Court 
acting as the Supreme Court the authority to adjudicate such cases. ENSAROĞLU, supra 
note 60, at 47. 
192. See Law No. 5982, art. 18 (noting the functions of the Constitutional Court as 
proposed under the Package); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 21 (providing an English 
translation of the 1982 Constitution in contrast with the Package proposal: “[B]y the 
Constitutional Court in its capacity as the Supreme Court”). 
193. See TASAM, supra note 127 (stating that normally, cases against the TBMM 
President, the Chief of Staff, the commanders of Land, Air, Naval and Gendarmerie 
Forces for their offences related to their duties have been brought to Military Court of 
Cassation); see also ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, at 47 (stating that the existing legislation 
lacked to regulate such cases). 
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by the Constitutional Court acting as the Supreme Court.194 The 
amended 1982 Constitution holds the judgments of the 
Supreme Court to be final decisions for the matter in question, 
whereas the consolidated version of the article allows for 
“[a]pplications for judicial review . . . against the decisions of 
the Supreme Court.”195 The new draft perceives the “[d]ecisions 
taken by the plenary assembly regarding th[e] application . . . 
[to] be final.”196 
12. Article 19: Functioning and Trial Procedure of the 
Constitutional Court 
Article 19 of the reform Package is the last amended article 
regarding the organization of the Constitutional Court.197 It 
revises Article 149 of the pre-amendment 1982 Constitution 
regarding the functioning and trial procedure of the Court.198 
The consolidated version introduces a quorum for the 
Constitutional Court to convene and increases the minimum 
number of votes required to close a political party, deprive it 
from government aid, or annul constitutional amendments, to 
two-thirds of the total number of parliamentary members.199 In 
                                                                                                             
194. See Law No. 5982, art. 18 (noting the changes made to the eighth paragraph 
of the amended Article 148 regarding applications for judicial review against the 
decisions of the Supreme Court); see also POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 21 (comparing 
Article 148 in the 1982 Constitution to the amended language of Article 148). 
195. Law No. 5982, art. 18 (noting the language of the proposed Article 148 in 
Turkish); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 21 (comparing Article 148 in the 1982 
Constitution, as it would appear in English, to the amended language of Article 148 
proposed by Article 18 in the Package). 
196. Law No. 5982, art. 18 (reflecting the amended language of Article 148 in 
Turkish); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 10, at 21 (comparing an English version of Article 
148 of the 1982 Constitution to the suggested language proposed by Article 19 of the 
Package). 
197. See Law No. 5982, art. 19 (noting the five paragraphs added to amended 
Article 149 regarding the functions and powers of the Constitutional Court); POLICY 
BRIEF, supra note 11, at 21–22 (comparing Article 149 in the 1982 Constitution to the 
amended language proposed in the Package—as translated into English). 
198. Law No. 5982, art. 19 (noting the revisions made to Article 149 regarding the 
functions and powers of the Constitutional Court); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 21–
22 (comparing Article 149 in the 1982 Constitution to the amended language 
proposed in Article 19 of the Package). 
199. Law No. 5982, art. 19 (noting the revisions made to Article 149 by the 
Package, including those regarding the General Assembly conventions, political party 
closure and deprivation cases, and the organization of the Constitutional Court); see 
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the 1982 Constitution, a three-fifths majority was required to 
make those decisions.200 The amended article also stipulates task 
sharing within the Constitutional Court by requiring the 
General Assembly of the Court to carry out “[c]ases and 
applications, annulment and appeal cases related with political 
parties, as well as trials where it acts as the Supreme Court,” and 
providing that the Chambers of the Court handle the individual 
applications.201 
13. Article 20: Military Court of Cassation 
Article 20 of the Package amends Article 156 of the pre-
amendment 1982 Constitution, which regulates the Military 
Court of Cassation.202 The organization and functioning of the 
Military Court of Cassation remains to be regulated by law, yet, 
the requirement that the regulation be in accordance “with the 
requirements of military service” is removed in the new draft.203 
14. Article 21: High Military Administrative Court 
Article 21 of the Package reforms Article 157 of the pre-
amendment 1982 Constitution regarding the High Military 
Administrative Court of Appeals.204 The new draft removes the 
                                                                                                             
POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 21 (comparing Article 149 in the 1982 Constitution to 
the amended language suggested in Article 19 of the Package). 
200. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası Nov. 7, 1982, art. 149 (Turk.) (indicating the 
voting requirement for decisions of Constitutional amendments and closure or 
deprivation of political parties in the 1982 Constitution); see also Law No. 5982, art. 19 
(noting the amended language of Article 149 in Turkish); Policy Brief, supra note 11, at 
21 (quoting Article 19 of the Package proposal in English: “The decision of annulment 
of Constitutional amendments and closure or the deprivation of the political parties 
from Government aid shall be taken by two-thirds of the total number of members.”). 
201. Law No. 5982, art. 19 (reflecting the amended language of Article 149 in 
Turkish); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 21 (comparing Article 149 in the 1982 
Constitution, in English, to the amended language proposed by Article 19). 
202. Law No. 5982, art. 20 (noting the final paragraph added to Article 156 of the 
amended 1982 Constitution regarding the regulation of the organization and 
functioning of the Military High Court of Appeals); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 22 
(comparing the language of Article 156 in the 1982 Constitution to the amended 
language proposed in Article 20 of the Package). 
203. Law No. 5982, art. 20 (reflecting the amended language of Article 156 in 
Turkish); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 22 (quoting the language of amended Article 
156 in English). 
204. Law No. 5982, art. 21 (noting the final paragraph added to Article 157 
regarding the regulation of the organization and functioning of the High Military 
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requirement that the organization and functioning of the Court 
“be regulated by law in accordance with . . . the security of 
tenure of judges within the requirements of military service.”205 
15. Article 22: Organization of the HSYK 
Article 22 of the draft revises Article 159 of the pre-
amendment 1982 Constitution regarding the restructuring of 
the HSYK.206 It is the most extensively edited article and makes 
one of the most controversial changes to the 1982 
Constitution.207 It proposes a significant increase in the number 
of HSYK members from seven to twenty-two regular members 
and twelve substitute members, who are to perform their duties 
in three chambers.208 According to the amended language of 
Article 159, the president of the HSYK continues to be the 
Minister of Justice, while the Undersecretary to the Minister of 
Justice continues to serve as an ex-officio member.209 While 
                                                                                                             
Administrative Court); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 23 (comparing the language of 
Article 157 in the 1982 Constitution to the language in Article 21 of the Package). 
205. Law No. 5982, art. 21 (emphasis added); see POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 
23 (comparing the language of Article 157 in the 1982 Constitution, as translated, to 
the language suggested by Article 21 of the Package); ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, at 42 
(stating that the amended language of Article 157 in the Package limits the jurisdiction 
of military courts). 
206. Law No. 5982, art. 22 (noting the eleven paragraphs added to Article 159 
regarding the HSYK); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 24–25 (comparing the language 
of Article 159 in the 1982 Constitution to the recommended language in Article 22 of 
the Package). 
207. See Law No. 5982, art. 22 (illustrating the eleven newly-added paragraphs 
recommended to supplant Article 159 of the 1982 Constitution regarding the HSYK); 
see also POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 24–25 (comparing the language of Article 159 in 
the 1982 Constitution to the amended language in Article 22 of the Package); Pelin 
Turgut, Turkey: A Referendum for Democracy or a Strongman?, TIME, Sept. 13, 2010, 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2018862,00.html#ixzz1ZmJI4bab 
(“The most controversial of the approved reforms paves the way for political 
appointments by parliament and the President to Turkey’s highest court, the 
Constitutional Court and the Supreme Board of Prosecutors and Judges.”). 
208. Law No. 5982, art. 22 (reflecting the amended language of Article 159 
regarding the organization of the HSYK in Turkish); see also ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, 
at 50 (noting that the number of permanent HSYK members is increased from seven to 
twenty-two). 
209. Law No. 5982, art. 22 (reflecting the language of Article 159 in the Package); 
see POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 24 (“The President of the Council is the Minister of 
Justice. The Undersecretary to the Minister of Justice shall be an ex-officio member of 
the Council.”). This language remains the same in the amended Article 159. POLICY 
BRIEF, supra note 11, at 24. 
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having a member of the government in councils similar to the 
HSYK is globally enforced, the lack of changes to the structure is 
regarded by some legal professionals as causing a dual 
representation problem.210 
In the context of appointing the HSYK members, the 
revised language of Article 159 sets forth that four of the twenty-
two regular members “shall be appointed by the [p]resident . . . 
for a term of four years from among . . . [professors of] law . . . 
and lawyers.”211 The majority of the members of HSYK shall be 
selected by the judges and prosecutors themselves.212 “The 
members may be re-elected at the end of their term of office.”213 
In addition, the consolidated version of Article 159 calls for the 
establishment of a General Secretariat under the HSYK, which 
shall be appointed by the President of the HSYK “from among 
the three candidates, who are first category judges and public 
prosecutors, proposed by the Council.”214 
                                                                                                             
210. See Law No. 5982, art. 22 (reflecting the language of Article 159 in the 
Package); see also ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, at 51 (noting that while a member of the 
political power acting as the head of institutions such as the HSYK is consistent with the 
global enforcement, the existence of a dual representation by both the Minister of 
Justice and the his Undersecretary in the HSYK is viewed as problematic by some in 
legal circles); see POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 24 (depicting the preserved language 
regarding the Minister of Justice and the Undersecretary in the Package). 
211. Law No. 5982, art. 22 (noting the language of Article 159 in the Package); 
POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 24 (quoting the amended language (in English) of 
Article 159 in the Package). 
212. Law No. 5982, art. 22. The amendment proposes the following institutions to 
appoint members to the HSYK from among their own members: three regular and 
three substitute members by the Plenary Assembly of the Court of Cassation, two 
regular and two substitute members by the Plenary Assembly of the Council of State 
and one regular and one substitute members by the Plenary Assembly of the Justice 
Academy of Turkey. See id. 
213. Law No. 5982, art. 22 (reflecting the language of amended Article 159 in 
Turkish); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 24 (translating into English a comparison of 
the changes recommended by the Package regarding the Supreme Council of Judges 
and Public Prosecutors, and the original text of the 1982 Constitution).  
214. Law No. 5982, art. 22; POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 24 (translating into 
English a comparison of the changes recommended by the Package regarding the 
Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors, and the original text of the 1982 
Constitution); see also HSYK Kanunu Tasarısı Kabul Edildi, HÜRRIYET (Dec. 11, 2010), 
http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=16506921 [hereinafter 
HSYK Kanun Tasarisi] (stating that the HSYK Draft Law, which was prepared in 
accordance with the amendments to Article 159 as accepted in the referendum, passed 
in the TBMM on December 11, 2010). 
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The revisions to Article 159 also propose new duties for the 
HSYK to carry out, such as “[t]he supervision of whether the 
judges and public prosecutors . . . undertak[e] their duties in 
accordance with the laws.”215 Moreover, while the pre-
amendment 1982 Constitution holds the decisions made by the 
Council as final, the Package paves the way for judicial review of 
decisions regarding the removal of judges and prosecutors from 
office, while continuing to prohibit appeals to other HSYK 
decisions.216 
16. Article 23: Economic and Social Council 
Article 23 of the Package revises Article 166 of the pre-
amendment 1982 Constitution regarding the planning of 
economic development.217 This amendment establishes the 
Economic and Social Council as a constitutional institution “to 
provide consultative opinions to the government in the design 
of economic and social policies” and guarantees its exercise, 
efficiency, and participation.218 NGOs, professional chambers, 
and government representatives shall gather within the Council 
structure and issue consultative opinions regarding economic 
and social issues.219 
                                                                                                             
215. Law No. 5982, art. 22 (reflecting the language of Article 159 in the Package); 
POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 25 (comparing the English translations of pre-
amendment language of the 1982 Constitution and the proposed language). 
216. See Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası Nov. 7, 1982, art. 149 (Turk.); see also 
POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 25 (providing an English translation of proposed Article 
22 of the Package: “The decisions of the Council, except for those concerning dismissal 
from profession, can not be appealed at judicial bodies”). 
217. Law No. 5982, art. 23 (noting the amended language of Article 166 of the 
1982 Constitution regarding the Planning, Economic and Social Council); POLICY 
BRIEF, supra note 11, at 26 (comparing the language of Article 166 in the 1982 
Constitution, titled Planning, Economic and Social Council, to the Package). 
218. Law No. 5982, art. 23 (noting the Turkish version of the proposed language 
of Article 166); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 10, at 26 (reflecting the English translations of 
the pre-amendment language of Article 166 and the language proposed in the 
Package); see ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, at 52 (arguing that although an existing 
institution, the Economic and Social Council is now granted constitutional guarantee 
and underlining the importance of organizing the Council as an independent review 
mechanism that promotes domestic peace and dialog). 
219. See Law No. 5982, art. 23 (noting the Turkish version of the proposed 
language of Article 166); see also TASAM, supra note 127 (noting that within the 
constitutional structure of the Council, different segments of the society including 
NGOs, professional chambers, and government representatives, shall come together to 
consult each other and issue opinions). 
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17. September 12, 2010: Results and Reactions 
With nearly eighty percent of the population participating 
in the referendum, and fifty-eight percent voting in favor of the 
Package, the AKP’s Erdoğan proclaimed victory on the evening 
of September 12, 2010.220 The results signaled a three-way split 
within the Turkish public; the western and southern coastal 
areas voted against the Package, a majority in central Anatolia 
voted for the proposal, and the Kurdish southeastern region 
boycotted the referendum, with an average participation rate of 
thirty-five percent.221 Prior to September 12, 2010, the main 
opposition party, CHP, expressed its skepticism of the law out of 
fear that the changes would undermine the independence of 
the judiciary and create a “modern-day sultan” out of 
Erdoğan.222 Following the referendum, one of CHP’s leaders, 
Berhan Şimsek, stated that by fusing the constitutional changes 
in one reform package instead of allowing the public to vote 
each amendment separately, the AKP had “coated a poisonous 
pill with chocolate.”223 The second opposition party, MHP, 
opined that Turkey had entered into “a dark era filled with 
                                                                                                             
220. See Turkey Vote Boosts PM Future, supra note 13 (indicating the referendum 
results); see also Marc Champion & Joe Parkinson, Turks Pass Constitutional Changes, 
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 13, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487
03897204575487281815955878.html (reporting Erdoğan’s statements at the AKP’s 
Istanbul headquarters after preliminary vote counts: “[o]nce more it has been seen 
that transformation is possible within democracy”). 
221. See Villelabeitia, supra note 27 (explaining the division of votes in the 2010 
Referendum); Referandum Türkiye’nin Üç Yüzünü Gösterdi, HÜRRIYET (Sept. 15, 2010, 
11:37PM), http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/planet/15777404.asp (arguing that the results 
have split Turkey into three). 
222. Turkey Needs More Reform, European Union Says after Vote, CNN (Sept. 13, 2010) 
(internal quotation marks omitted), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-09-13/world/
turkey.referendum_1_erdogan-turkish-voters-reform-package?_s=PM:WORLD 
(reporting CHP’s concerns regarding the referendum as it would affect the prime 
minister’s power over the judiciary); see also Ömer Taşpınar, Judicial Independence and 
Democracy in Turkey, TODAY’S ZAMAN (Oct. 10, 2010), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0712_turkey_democracy_taspinar.aspx 
(reporting that those in opposition to the referendum perceived the Package as a step 
toward undermining the independence of the judiciary). 
223. Turkey Needs More Reform, European Union Says after Vote, supra note 222 
(“Berhan Simsek . . . told CNN that by packaging the judicial changes with less 
controversial proposals, the AKP had ‘coated a poisonous pill with chocolate.’”); see also 
Turkey’s Top Court Accepts Main Opposition’s Appeal for Cancellation of Gvt-Backed 
Constitutional Amendment, TURKISHPRESS.COM (June 9, 2010) [hereinafter Turkey’s Top 
Court], http://www.turkishpress.com/news.asp?id=352716 (reporting CHP’s skepticism 
of the reform package). 
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critical risks and dangers” where the accepted amendments 
might foster instability, possibly leading to rebellions among 
Kurdish citizens seeking their autonomy in the southeastern 
regions of the country.224 
Some journalists critical of the AKP’s motives compared 
contemporary Turkey to revolutionary Iran of 1979, pointing to 
what they saw as the AKP’s “Islamist agenda” concealed under 
its liberal reform efforts.225 These journalists highlighted to the 
public “early signs in the AKP’s visceral anti-American rhetoric 
and its banishment of women from top posts, as well as the 
arrests and firings of political rivals.”226 The consensus among 
these journalists seemed to be that the majority of the voters 
supporting the referendum had not read and comprehended 
the articles, and voted according to their political affiliations.227 
                                                                                                             
224. See Torchia, supra note 13 (quoting MHP leader, Devlet Bahceli who voiced 
his concerns about the amendment package); see also HATEM ETE, NUH YILMAZ & KADİR 
ÜSTÜN, SETA FOUND. FOR POLITICAL, ECON. AND SOC. RESEARCH, REPORT NO: 5, 
POLICY REPORT: TURKEY’S CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM OF 2010 AND INSIGHTS FOR 
THE GENERAL ELECTIONS OF 2011, 11 (Feb. 2011) [hereinafter POLICY REPORT], 
available at http://setav.org/public/HaberDetay.aspx?Dil=tr&hid=66186&q=turkey-s-
constitutional-referendum-of-2010 (reporting that prior to the referendum, the MHP 
had “claimed that the referendum was part of the ‘destruction project’ the AK Party 
had started . . . and that the country would be divided if the referendum obtained a 
majority favorable vote”). 
225. See Soner Yalçın, İran’a Şeriat ‘Demokrasi’ ve ‘Özgürlük’ Vaatleriyle Geldi, 
HÜRRIYET (Sept. 23, 2007), http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=
7341410&yazarid=218 (comparing Turkey to pre-1979 Iran); see also Arsu & Bilefsky, 
supra note 13, at A4 (observing the pro-democracy activists’ concerns about potential 
power-shifting in one political direction); Turkey PM to Hold Talks on Charter Reform with 
Rivals, TIMES OF OMAN, Mar. 20, 2010 (reporting some journalists’ view that the AKP 
uses “liberal reform as a cover for the encroachment of religious rule”). 
226. Soner Çağaptay & David Pollock, The Scary European Model: It’s Not Modern, 
Liberal, or Western, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 2, 2010, 4:00AM), available at 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/08/02/the-scary-european-
model.html; see Arsu & Bilefsky, supra note 13, at A4 (noting that “opponents of the 
changes describe them as an orchestrated power grab aimed at undermining the 
secular order established by . . . Atatürk”); see also Barry Rubin, Turkey’s Referendum 
Doesn’t Mean Popular Support for a Regime Aligning with Iran, THE RUBIN REPORT (Sept. 
25, 2010, 8:27 PM), http://rubinreports.blogspot.com/2010/09/word-on-turkish-
referendum-dont-assume.html (listing the contradictory decisions of the AKP and 
asserting that if it weren’t for the fear of “the provisions strengthening the regime—90 
percent of Turks would have supported the proposed changes instead of just 58 
percent”). 
227. See Cüneyt Ülsever, Column, Ağır Mağlubiyet, HÜRRIYET (Sept. 14, 2010), 
http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=15777182&yazarid=3 
(expressing the author’s disappointment, a day after the referendum, that it is 
impossible for any voter to have detailed knowledge on all of the twenty-six articles and 
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The view in academia seems to be divided.228 On the one 
hand, those who question the amendments proposed by the 
AKP, worry that it will fill the courts and the HSYK with judges 
and members who stand close to the party.229 On the other 
hand, some interpret the results as an indicator of a Turkish 
majority opposing “the influence of the military and judiciary in 
active politics,” believing that the reforms would make Turkey 
more democratic and increase government accountability to the 
general public.230 
Journalists who sympathize with the AKP, including 
columnists of the Turkish newspaper Zaman, believe that the 
tension between the military and the government is not caused 
by the Islamist background of the AKP, but rather by the party’s 
intention to enter political areas that traditionally have been 
only theoretically under governmental authority.231 In actuality, 
these areas were supervised by the military.232 Therefore, as in 
the case of past political parties that had been eliminated by a 
coup d’état, the AKP’s interference in institutions under military 
control instills a fear among secularist state elites of losing their 
                                                                                                             
either completely embrace or completely reject all of them); see also note 221 and 
accompanying text (discussing the three-way split among Turks in the referendum 
votes). 
228. See infra notes 229–30 (discussing the split within academia over the 
referendum). 
229. See Sabrina Tavernise & Sebnem Arsu, In Turkey, Proposed Amendments would 
Marginalize Old Guard, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2010, at A4 (reporting a professor’s fear that 
the AKP will fill spots with allies). See generally HSYK Ak Parti'nin Politikaları İçin Aparat 
Haline Geldi, RADIKAL, Aug. 28, 2011 (discussing that the opposition party CHP 
accused the AKP of turning the HSYK into a device for its political ideology). 
230. See Arsu & Bilefsky, supra note 13, at A4 (reporting the view that the 
amendments will democratize Turkish politics); see also POLICY REPORT, supra note 
224(stating that the referendum serves as the Turkish public’s “final say” on the issue 
of democracy and paves the way for a new civilian constitution).  
231. See Emre Uslu, Column, Basics of the Turkish Political System: Politics, TODAY’S 
ZAMAN (July 17, 2010), http://www.sundayszaman.com/sunday/columnistDetail_
getNewsById.action?newsId=216242 (taking the view that the AKP’s delving into certain 
political areas led to a civilian-military crisis); cf. Head, supra note 129 (quoting Yavuz 
Baydar, a pro-AKP columnist: “[the AKP’s] very loud, aggressive, pushy . . . combative 
style” caused Erdoğan to gradually lose support and face a “profound mistrust from 
certain segments of the republic”). 
232. See Uslu, supra note 231 (“The civilian-military crisis during the term of the 
AKP government is not about their Islamist past but about their intention to influence 
political areas that are under the responsibility of the government on paper but not in 
practice.”); supra notes 30–34 and accompanying text (explaining the military’s 
historical supervisory role over civilian politics with constituional examples) 
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privileged position in the Turkish political system.233 In sum, the 
AKP supporters in the media have welcomed the referendum 
results as a manifestation of a request by Turkish society for a 
substantial change in the system, and they have interpreted the 
AKP’s victory as a vote of confidence foreshadowing a third 
victory in nationwide polls.234 
Following the referendum, Turkey’s European Affairs 
Minister, Egemen Bağış, stated that passing the amendments 
showed the Turkish people’s determination for democracy, 
human rights and a market economy.235 He further analyzed 
that the referendum would lead to accelerated negotiations with 
the EU regarding Turkey’s application for membership.236 
The majority of foreign media organizations and politicians 
have welcomed the results of the referendum, while 
simultaneously calling attention to the imbalance in Turkish 
politics caused by the ten percent minimum popular vote 
threshold that parties must receive to sit in parliament.237 In an 
                                                                                                             
233. See Emre Uslu, Basics of the Turkish Political System, TODAY’S ZAMAN, July 12, 
2010 (discussing the the republican elite’s fear of losing the state against their political 
rivals in domestic politics); see also Uslu, supra note 231 (“The major policy decisions 
are not made in the Cabinet meetings but in meetings between generals and some 
members of the cabinet at the National Security Council (MGK). Military generals 
consider this system a useful way of influencing politics. . . . The opposition parties treat 
the MGK’s decisions as if it were divine rule.”); see, e.g., Yalçın, supra note 225 
(comparing the constitutional efforts of the AKP to the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 
1979 which was feared by Iranian leftists, republicans, democrats and liberals). 
234. See Mümtaz’er Türköne, “Değişim” Hep Kazanacak, ZAMAN ONLINE (Sept. 16, 
2010), http://www.zaman.com.tr/yazar.do?yazino=1028128 (suggesting that the 
referendum results indicate the society’s strong desire for change); see also Erdogan Says 
to Start Work on New Constitution, ALARABIYA.NET (Sept. 12, 2010), 
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2010/09/13/119168.html (reporting predictions 
from pundits that the affirmative votes at the referendum signal that the AKP will win a 
third term in government). But cf. Arsu & Bilefsky, supra note 13, at A4 (reporting 
analysts’ opinions that while the margin of affirmative votes indicates the AKP’s high 
chances of winning re-election, the margin is also likely to polarize the country further 
entrenching ideological divides). See generally Taşpınar, supra note 222 (stating that the 
results would indicate political parties’ success in the general elections of 2011). 
235. See Interview by Aydin Ali Ihsan with Egemen Bağış, European Affairs 
Minister, Republic of Turk., EURONEWS (Sept. 13, 2010) (reporting Turkey’s European 
Affairs Minister’s reaction in the aftermath of the referendum). 
236. See id. (noting Egemen Bağış’s analysis of how the referendum results would 
affect Turkey’s bid to enter the EU). 
237. See Coups Away, supra note 73 (discussing the reactions by non-Turkish media 
and politicians to the referendum); see also Türkische Verfassungsreform International 
Begrüßt, DIE PRESSE (Sept. 13, 2010), http://diepresse.com/home/politik/
aussenpolitik/594039/Tuerkische-Verfassungsreform-international-begruesst?from=
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article published in July 2010, Newsweek drew attention to a new 
Turkey as the political and economic center of its own region, 
“forging a new foreign policy, with itself at the very center.”238 
The article alerted its readers to the mistake of seeing Turkey 
either “‘with’ the EU and U.S., or ‘with’ the Muslim world or 
Russia” since the “new, strongly Turkey-centered policy” of the 
country encompasses all of these positions.239 In a second 
Newsweek article, it was acknowledged that the results of the 
referendum could lead to a remaking of Turkey in Erdoğan’s 
image, turning away from the country’s traditional Western 
allies and joining “forces . . . with anti-US hardliners in the 
Middle East,” a development that gives the US government the 
“jitters.”240 
Overall, however, spectators outside of Turkey have 
welcomingly received the referendum results as progress toward 
a more democratic Turkey in line with EU expectations.241 A 
statement from US President Barack Obama, acknowledged the 
referendum outcome as illustrative of the “vibrancy of Turkey’s 
democracy.”242 Joost Lagendijk, a former European MP, stated 
that Europeans, “despite sharing some of the criticism on the 
details,” backed the Package.243 EU Commissioner Stefan Fuele 
agreed with his colleague’s comments by applauding the 
amendments as “a step in the right direction” and a 
                                                                                                             
suche.intern.portal (reporting that the referendum results in Turkey were welcomed 
internationally); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 9 (“To participate in the 
distribution of seats, a party must obtain at least 10% of the votes cast at the national 
level . . . .”). 
238. Owen Matthews, Ankara in the Middle, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 2, 2010. 
239. Id. 
240. Matthews, supra note 16 (explaining US concerns regarding the effects of the 
referendum). 
241. See infra note 242–47 and accompanying text (summarizing the reactions by 
non-Turkish media and political circles); see also Türkische Verfassungsreform International 
Begrüßt, supra note 237 (discussing the international response to the referendum 
results, including statements made by the US President, the German Foreign Minister, 
and EU officials). 
242. Referendum in Turkey, BUSINESS RECORDER (Pak.), Sept. 15, 2010 (quoting 
President Barack Obama in his reaction to Turkey’s referendum results); Arsu & 
Bilefsky, supra note 13, at A4 (reporting a statement released by US President Barack 
Obama referring to the 2010 referendum as an illustration of “the vibrancy of Turkey’s 
democracy”). 
243. Turgut, supra note 9 (quoting a statement mady by Joost Lagendijk in the 
Radikal). 
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manifestation of Turkey’s commitment to join the EU.244 
Nevertheless, Fuele added that Turkey had a long path in front 
of it and needed to implement further reforms “to address the 
remaining priorities [such as those] in the area of fundamental 
rights.”245 Foreign Ministers of Finland, Germany, and the 
United Kingdom have also remarked on the constitutional 
referendum results and called for more momentum.246 While 
Germany and France have been long-term opponents of 
Turkey’s EU membership, the Finnish foreign minister made 
highly supportive statements: “Only by having a seat at the table 
will Turkey be able to contribute fully to the security and 
prosperity of the EU’s member states.”247  
III. ANALYSIS OF THE AMENDMENT PACKAGE 
Part III examines the Package in two sections. Section A 
encompasses articles that revise the fundamental rights and 
freedoms and economic rights and duties of citizens, and 
Section B discusses the articles that amend the structure and 
organization of the judiciary. This Part analyzes only those 
revisions that pose significant consequences to the EU accession 
process or the balancing of certain powers in Turkish politics. 
A. Fundamental Rights and Freedoms & Economic Rights and Duties 
By emphasizing the importance of the individual, the 
amendments regarding fundamental rights and freedoms seek 
to produce a more liberal and rights-based approach in the 
                                                                                                             
244. EU Welcomes Turkey Referendum Victory, FINANCIAL MIRROR, Sept. 13, 2010. 
245. Id. 
246. Joanna Sopinska, EU/Turkey: EU Welcomes Constitutional Reforms, Urges Ankara 
to Go Further, EUROPOLITICS, Sept. 13, 2010 (“While the UK and Finland argued for the 
acceleration of the accession talks, others led by Germany advocated building closer 
ties outside the framework of Ankara’s EU membership bid.”); see also German Minister 
Urges ‘Fair Treatment’ of Turkey in EU Accession Process, BBC, Sept. 14, 2010 (quoting 
German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle: “[The referendum] showed that Turkey 
[is] orienting itself towards Europe.”). 
247. Sopinska, supra note 246 (quoting Finland’s Foreign Minister); see also 
German, French Leaders Stand United against Turkey, TODAY’S ZAMAN (May 12, 2009) 
(reporting that as longtime opponents to Turkey’s EU bid, leaders of Germany and 
France reiterated their stance against Turkey’s EU membership). 
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relationship between Turkish citizens and the state.248 These 
portions in the Package particularly provide greater freedom 
and opportunity for women and minorities in Turkish society 
and improve the protection of constitutional rights and 
liberties.249 
For example, the amendment to Article 10 broadens the 
group of citizens that can benefit from the principle of equality 
by including children, elderly, disabled, and widows and 
orphans of martyrs as well as for invalid and veterans in the 
list.250 By adding these individuals to the group of protected 
citizens, the Package broadens the scope of the meaning of 
equality, which constitutes the foundational element of human 
rights.251 
The changes made to Article 53 of the amended 1982 
Constitution entitle civil servants and other government officials 
to collective bargaining and collective agreement rights, but fall 
short of granting them the right to strike.252 As such, the 
amended Constitution presents civil servants and public officials 
as a party vis-à-vis the state, instead of treating them as part of 
the state.253 The amendments in the Package fail to define the 
content and the scope of the right to collective agreement; while 
they benefit pensioners by allowing them to take advantage of 
collective agreement provisions.254 Even though the proposed 
language falls short of effecting a dramatic change in the 
Constitution, these shortcoming may be remedied with a public 
                                                                                                             
248. See supra note 141 and accompanying text (discussing how the amendments 
are grouped throughout this Comment). 
249. See supra note 141 and accompanying text (noting that the first group of 
amendments relate to fundamental rights and freedoms). 
250. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (citing the language of the 
Article 1 of the Package, proposed to reform Article 10 of the 1982 Constitution, and 
affecting equality for women and minority groups). 
251. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (reflecting the changes in the 
language including the list of protected citizens added to the revised Article 10). 
252. See supra notes 144–46 and accompanying text (discussing Article 6 of the 
Package, which revises Article 53 of the amended 1982 Constitution). 
253. See supra notes 144–46 and accompanying text (introducing the revised 
language that grants civil servants and public officials the right to conclude collective 
agreements with the government). 
254. See supra note 145 and accompanying text (discussing Article 6 of the 
Package, which introduces collective agreement rights to public officials and 
pensioners). 
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administration reform that will be drafted in accordance with 
the Package and include the right to strike.255 
Changes made to Article 54 regarding the right to strike 
and lockout remove the third paragraph concerning union 
liability for any damages caused during strikes.256 Previously, 
Article 54 guaranteed secure workplaces in response to union 
efforts to keep the premises damage-free.257 The Package lifts 
the unions’ responsibility, which may lead to an incentive for 
unions to utilize their right to strike or it may render individual 
employees liable and thus severely weaken the effective use of 
the right to strike.258 In addition, the deletion of the seventh 
paragraph regarding the prohibition of political strikes, 
lockouts, and go-slows must be viewed as a step toward a more 
liberal constitution.259 By removing the list of actions that have 
been identified with the events leading to the 1980 Coup, the 
proponents of the Package aim to obliterate the traces of a 
period many Turks regret.260. 
The changes to Article 74 broaden the right to legal 
remedies by introducing a constitutional right to information 
and to petition to the Ombudsman Office, which shall be 
established to review the operations of the administration.261 
Although the revised Article 74 is a step supported by the global 
human rights organization, there remain concerns regarding 
some aspects of the Ombudsman Office as introduced in the 
                                                                                                             
255. See supra notes 144–46 and accompanying text (noting the changes 
introduced in the consolidated version of Article 53 that allows parties to appeal to the 
Conciliation Board of Public Servants). 
256. See supra notes 147–48 and accompanying text (discussing Article 7 of the 
Package, which revises Article 54 of the amended 1982 Constitution). 
257. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (reflecting the repealed portion of 
Article 54 that held labor unions liable for any damage caused in work places during 
strikes). 
258. See supra note 147 and accompanying text (noting that the deleted language 
removed strike and lockout prohibitions introduced by the 1980 Coup). 
259. See supra notes 148–49 and accompanying text (noting that general and 
politically motivated strikes are considered human rights in developed countries). 
260. See supra notes 64–71 and accompanying text (summarizing the social and 
political events in Turkey between 1971 and 1980). 
261. See supra notes 150–53 and accompanying text (stating the changes the 
Package introduces with the revised language of Article 74). 
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Package.262 One of those concerns is the length of the 
Ombudsman’s term of office, which coincides with the new 
legislative session and, therefore, does not fully guarantee the 
independence of the Ombudsman Office.263 A structure that 
allows for a twelve-year term, which is also the length of 
Constitutional Court memberships, may guarantee a more 
autonomous institution.264 In addition, the Ombudsman Office 
is organized as subordinate to the TBMM Presidency which is a 
structure inconsistent with EU procedures.265 In order for it to 
serve as an autonomous institution and to avoid future legal 
issues, the Ombudsman Office, the term of office, and its 
relations with other human rights institutions must be 
structured carefully.266 The independence and goodwill of the 
Chief Ombudsman will remain as two vital factors in electing a 
person to the office. 
Moreover, the right to information, instead of existing as an 
absolute constitutional right embodied in its own article, which 
would allow the public to enjoy a higher degree of transparency 
in government, is squeezed into Article 74.267 Constraining the 
language about the right to information and petition to one 
sentence, may lead to its exercise only in matters and 
proceedings undertaken by government entities. In order to 
provide an absolute right to information, the right to 
                                                                                                             
262. See supra note 154 and accompanying text (discussing the international 
standards for the Ombudsman Office and concerns about its structure as set forth in 
the Package). 
263. See supra note 155 and accompanying text (discussing the language of and 
changes to Article 74 which set forth a four year term for the Ombudsman and 
depicting the concerns regarding the term of office). 
264. See supra note 155 and accompanying text (illustrating the four year term of 
office for the Ombudsman which coincides with the new legislative year and therefore, 
renders the independence of the Ombudsman questionable); see also supra note 186 
and accompanying text (stating that Article 147 in the Package limits the Constitutional 
Court membership to twelve years). 
265. See supra note 155 and accompanying text (noting the revisions made in the 
proposed language of Article 74 and stating that the Ombudsman Office in European 
countries is independent of the Parliament, even though it works on behalf of the 
Parliament). 
266. See supra notes 150–53 and accompanying text (stating that the Package sets 
forth an independent Ombudsman Office that is subordinate to the TBMM 
Presidency). 
267. See supra notes 151–52 and accompanying text (stating that the revision to 
the right to information and appeal constitutes one phrase only, while there are three 
paragraphs added to the revised Article 74 regarding the Ombudsman Office). 
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information should be drafted in a separate article in the 
Constitution. 
In relation to TBMM membership, the revisions to Article 
84 as stipulated in the Package generated some criticism among 
those who believe that the 1982 constitutional provisions are 
sufficient protection for deputies.268 There is some room for 
discussion as to why the new draft permits the retaining TBMM 
membership for a deputy, whose party has been banned for 
being unconstitutional and whose statements and actions have 
caused the closure of his party.269 Nevertheless, this amendment 
is another significant step in bringing the Turkish Constitution 
closer to its European counterparts, as the changes to Article 84 
are in line with the conventional democratic principles of the 
EU.270 
Finally, the amendments to Article 166, regarding the 
Planning, Economic and Social Council, lack substantive 
information regarding what type of constitutional guarantee this 
council is granted.271 While there are concerns regarding the use 
of the Council as a tool for the government to regulate 
economic and social policies, it is nonetheless a democratic 
insertion to the 1982 Constitution and valuable for 
strengthening social dialogue channels.272 The consolidated 
version of Article 166 enables NGOs to express their views and 
participate in the planning of policies.273 The amendment is a 
major step toward a participatory system, in which various 
segments of society, such as NGOs, professional chambers, and 
government representatives, can discuss various topics and 
                                                                                                             
268. See supra notes 158–59 (noting that the pre-amendment language of Article 
84 is sufficient as it grants TBMM members legislative non-liability for their 
statements). 
269. See supra note 158 and accompanying text (noting the changes in the 
language of the article). 
270. See supra note 158 and accompanying text (noting that in the past, the ECHR 
has repeatedly decided that the regulations in the Turkish Constitution regarding 
political bans and loss of TBMM membership violate Article 3 of the Protocol No. 1 of 
the Convention concerning the right to elect and be elected). 
271. See supra notes 217–18 and accompanying text (discussing the Package’s 
amendments to Article 166 of the 1982 Constitution). 
272. See supra note 219 and accompanying text (discussing how different segments 
of society can gather and consult each other within the Council). 
273. See supra notes 217–19 and accompanying text (describing the importance of 
organizing the Council as an independent review mechanism that promotes domestic 
peace and dialog). 
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contribute to the solution-finding process for economic and 
social issues in Turkey.274 
B. Reorganization of the Judiciary 
The second part of the Package aims to reorganize the 
judiciary by restructuring the composition and scope of the 
HSYK and restricting the judicial power of military courts.275 The 
changes can be categorized under three groups: those regarding 
the Constitutional Court (Articles 16 through 19); those 
concerning the HSYK (Articles 14 and 22); and those relating to 
the military justice (Articles 11, 15, 20, and 21). 
Articles 16 through 19 of the Package, which amend 
Articles 146 through 149 of the amended 1982 Constitution, 
address the changes made to the Constitutional Court. The 
revisions made to Article 146, regarding the organization of the 
Constitutional Court, introduce greater diversity among the 
institutions from which the members of the Constitutional 
Court are selected.276 The amended Article 146 also takes away 
the broad appointment power of the President.277 With these 
amendments, the President now has the power to appoint 
fourteen of the seventeen Constitutional Court members, four 
of which he will select directly from certain categories and ten of 
which he will select from the list of names submitted to him.278 
The presence of two military judges in the Constitutional Court, 
to be appointed by the President, is questionable if the goal of 
the Package is to create a more democratic structure.279 
                                                                                                             
274. See supra note 219 and accompanying text (discussing how different segments 
of society can gather and consult each other within the Council). 
275. See supra note 141 and accompanying text (dividing the amendment package 
into two categories). 
276. See supra notes 178–81 and accompanying text (summarizing the revisions 
made by Article 16). 
277. See supra notes 178–81 and accompanying text (summarizing the revisions 
made by Article 16 including the reduced appointment powers of the President). Cf. 
supra note 78 and accompanying text (stating that the 1982 Constitution grants the 
President broad powers). 
278. See supra note 181 and accompanying text (distinguishing the requirement of 
two military judges in the court as stipulated in the consolidated version of Article 146). 
279. See supra notes 180–81 and accompanying text (arguing that in democratic 
states political powers and parliaments, therefore civilians, play a significant role in the 
election of Constitutional Court members); see also supra notes 30–32 and 
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Moreover, amended Article 146 introduces a minimum age 
requirement of forty-five for judges, while the changes to Article 
147 propose a twelve-year term of office for members of the 
Constitutional Court.280 These two changes are necessary to 
ensure the constant transformation, evolution, and 
modernization of the Court as well as accommodation of 
change.281 Twelve years are sufficient for members to gain 
experience and reflect these experiences in their work, and it is 
also likely sufficient for the social developments in Turkey to be 
manifested in the composition of the Court. Moreover, the 
changes bring the Constitutional Court closer to the courts of 
Europe, most of which have non-renewable terms of nine to 
twelve years and a retirement age of seventy years.282  
One peculiar change to note is the number of non-lawyers 
in the Constitutional Court, which the Package raised from five 
members to nine members.283 This revision increases the group 
of persons who do not hold a law degree in an institution that 
serves as the highest legal body of the country. 
On the one hand, this composition of the Court allows for 
flexibility and reflects social changes in the country.284 Overall, 
the changes fall short of attaining the level of independent 
judiciary set forth in the 1961 Constitution terms of an and 
should be supplemented with further reforms in this branch.285  
                                                                                                             
accompanying text (summarizing the history of military role in Turkish politics and 
society). 
280. See supra notes 182, 184 and accompanying text (providing the amended 
language of Article 146 and 147 which incorporate the limitations on the term of office 
and minimum age for Constitutional Court membership). 
281. See supra note 184 and accompanying text (noting the twelve year limitation 
for Constitutional Court memberships and arguing that this period is sufficient for a 
judge to gain experience and at the same time allow the Court to reflect social changes 
in its profile). 
282. See supra note 184 and accompanying text (noting that in many European 
courts, the term of office for judges are set to be non-renewable terms of nine to twelve 
years); see also supra note 157 (stating that Article 23 of the Charter stipulates the term 
of office and dismissal for judges in the ECHR). 
283. See supra notes 178–81 and accompanying text (reflecting the changes made 
to the organization of the Constitutional Court). 
284. See supra notes 187–96 and accompanying text (discussing revisions to Article 
148 of the Constitution). 
285. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (noting that the 1961 Constitution 
institutionalized judicial review and the complete independence of the judiciary); see 
also supra note 180 (stating that the election power granted to the TBMM by the 1961 
Constitution were terminated after the military coup in 1971). 
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The Package introduces the right of individual recourse in 
the amended language of Article 148, regarding the functions 
and powers of the Constitutional Court.286 By allowing an 
individual citizen to bring his case before the highest court in 
the country, the Package may relieve the European Court of 
Human Rights from numerous cases brought by Turkish citizens 
dissatisfied with the legal remedies presented in their country.287 
Another critical change in Article 148 allows the trial of 
generals and commanders before the Supreme Court for 
offenses related to their duties.288 These individuals are added to 
the list of officials who can be tried before the Constitutional 
Court acting as the Supreme Court, which in the pre-
amendment 1982 Constitution already includes the President, 
Prime Minister, members of the Council of Ministers, members, 
and presidents of higher courts, members of the HSYK, and 
members of the Court of Accounts.289 The consolidated version 
of Article 148 no longer renders the aforementioned 
commanders and the Chief of Staff subject to military courts, 
thus, moving them away from the burdens of the military 
hierarchy.290  
The functioning and trial procedure of the Constitutional 
Court is addressed in amended Article 149, which revises the 
structure of the Constitutional Court according to the 
amendments made in Articles 146–148 and divides the work 
                                                                                                             
286. See supra note 189 and accompanying text (providing the amended language 
of Article 148 regarding the right to individual application to the Constitutional 
Court). 
287. See supra note 189 and accompanying text (noting the additions to Article 
148 that allow anyone, who claims that any of their fundamental rights and freedoms 
guaranteed under the Constitution and ECHR have been violated by the public 
authorities, to apply to the Constitutional Court). 
288. See supra notes 191–93 and accompanying text (noting the revised language 
regarding the trial of certain officials before the Constitutional Court). 
289. See supra notes 191–93 and accompanying text (indicating that the 
Constitutional Court shall act in its capacity as the Supreme Court when trying certain 
military official for their offences related to their duties). 
290. See supra notes 191–92 and accompanying text (noting the revisions to Article 
148 regarding the trial of certain officials before the Constitutional Court acting as the 
Supreme Court and adding that the Package fills a gap in regulation regarding the 
adjudication of such cases which had been normally brought to the Military Court of 
Cassation). 
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between the General Assembly and the Chambers.291 While it 
may seem that most of the work has been given to the General 
Assembly, considering the high number of individual 
applications, in contrast to the more substantive but smaller 
number of closures, annulments, and appeals cases indicates 
that the workload of the General Assembly will likely be 
comparable to that of the Chambers. 292 
Articles 14 and 22, which affect changes in Articles 144 and 
159 of the amended 1982 Constitution, address the changes 
made to the HSYK. The 1982 Constitution assigns the duty to 
supervise and investigate the performance of judges and public 
prosecutors to judiciary inspectors with the permission of the 
Ministry of Justice.293 The chief supervisor of these inspectors at 
the highest level is the Ministry of Justice, a structure 
inconsistent with the principle of judicial independence.294 The 
amended Article 144 introduces a two-fold inspection structure 
by providing the HSYK with the duty of inspection of judicial 
services and the administrative duties of public prosecutors and 
keeping the inspection of judicial services not related to the 
judicial duties in the realm of the judicial inspectors 
subordinated to the Ministry of Justice.295 This structure allows 
the HSYK a basis for carrying out its work without the risk of 
political interference. Nevertheless, the Minister of Justice 
continues to chair the council and, accordingly, the investigative 
authority of the HSYK remains subject to his approval. 
In addition, this revision may also result in the appointment 
of judicial inspectors who are neither judges nor public 
prosecutors, because the qualification to “be a judge or a 
prosecutor by profession” is required only in the case of internal 
auditors and a similar requirement is not stated for judicial 
                                                                                                             
291. See supra note 201 and accompanying text (discussing the task sharing 
stipulated in the revised version of Article 149). 
292. See supra notes 197–201 and accompanying text (discussing Article 149 and 
the Constitutional Courts). 
293. See supra notes 165–66 and accompanying text (discussing the changes to 
Article 144). 
294. See supra notes 209–10 and accompanying text (noting that the dual 
representation problem caused by the presidency of the Minister of Justice and the 
membership of the Undersecretariat to the Minister of Justice in the HSYK). 
295. See supra notes 165–66 and accompanying text (discussing the changes to 
Article 144). 
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inspectors.296 Aside from the background constraints, the new 
draft fails to define the content, scope of authority, and requisite 
qualifications of an internal auditor. If left as is, this revision 
does not constitute a reform in the judiciary. 
The second article regarding the HSYK, Article 159, 
addresses the organization of Council. The HSYK was 
established by the 1982 Constitution to admit judges and public 
prosecutors into professions, appointments, transfers, and 
promotions, and to impose disciplinary penalties, and the 
removal of judges and prosecutors from office.297 Unfortunately, 
the HSYK today constitutes a hindrance to the Turkish state of 
law as it is headed by the Minister of Justice and comprised of 
members, including the Undersecretary to the Minister of 
Justice, the Court of Cassation, and the Council of State.298 The 
removal of the Minister of Justice or at least the Undersecretary 
to the Minister of Justice from the HSYK would remove the dual 
representation problem and result in the highest level of 
independence of the HSYK.299 Nevertheless, by increasing the 
number of HSYK members, and prohibiting the Minister of 
Justice from voting in the Chambers and participating in their 
meetings, the new draft significantly weakens the influence of 
these three institutions within the HSYK.300  
Articles 11, 15, 20, and 21, which amend Articles 125, 145, 
156, and 157 of the 1982 Constitution address the changes made 
to the military justice system. The consolidated version of Article 
125 stands in great contrast to the 1982 language of Article 125 
that rules out any type of judicial review for the acts of the 
                                                                                                             
296. See supra notes 165–66 and accompanying text (differentiating between the 
qualifications required for internal auditors and those required for judicial inspectors 
as amended in the Package).  
297. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (listing the HSYK as one of the 
newly established institutions under the 1982 Constitution). 
298. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (noting the influence the executive 
could exert in the judiciary through the structure of the HSYK according to the 
original 1982 Constitution). 
299. See supra notes 209–10 and accompanying text (noting that the dual 
representation problem caused by the presidency of the Minister of Justice and the 
membership of the Undersecretary to the Minister of Justice in the HSYK). 
300. See supra notes 206–16 (noting the changes to Article 159); see also notes 209–
10 and accompanying text (noting that the presidency of the Minister of Justice in the 
HSYK, while enforced in other democracies, hinders the absolute independence of the 
HSYK). 
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President and the decisions of YAŞ.301 Aside from these two types 
of decisions, the 1982 Constitution denies judicial review of 
decisions made by the HSYK, the Court of Accounts, and the 
Supreme Election Board, as well those decisions made under 
emergency laws and disciplinary penalties against public 
servants.302 By allowing judicial review of at least some HSYK 
decisions, the Package establishes an effective remedy against 
such judgments, signifying a move in the direction of a more 
democratic constitution. Yet, because it qualifies the decisions 
that can be appealed, the Package does not achieve the 
liberalism that a constitution of a state of law requires.303 In 
order to provide an efficient remedy, reform of legal regulations 
and military justice are necessary. 
Finally, the consolidated Article 125 stipulates that judicial 
power shall be limited to control of the lawfulness of 
administrative actions and procedures and that under no 
circumstance be used as the control of expediency.304 Judicial 
bodies are not institutions that take administrative actions; but 
rather they have the duty of conducting judicial review. Adding 
a specific sentence regarding this established principle in the 
Package is unnecessary, as it does not provide any legal 
conclusions, but most likely has the purpose of suggesting that 
in the past, judicial power was used as the control of 
expediency.305  
The original text of Article 145 regarding military justice 
was the product of the 1980 Coup.306 The pre-amendment 
language grants military courts extensive jurisdiction by allowing 
them to hear cases of military personnel who have committed 
                                                                                                             
301. See supra notes 161–62 and accompanying text (discussing the right of appeal 
to certain YAŞ decisions under the amended version Article 125). 
302. See supra notes 162–63 and accompanying text (noting that judicial remedies 
shall be available against the decisions of the Supreme Military Council). 
303. See supra notes 160–64 and accompanying text (providing proposed changes 
to Article 125 regarding judicial remedies against certain decisions made by YAŞ). 
304. See supra note 164 and accompanying text (stating the limitation of judicial 
power of HSYK as stipulated in the consolidated version of Article 125). 
305. See supra note 164 and accompanying text (discussing the addition to Article 
125, which reiterates the established principle that judicial power shall “under no 
circumstance be used as the control of expediency”). 
306. See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text (providing a summary of the 
drafting process for the 1982 Constitution that involved almost no public participation 
and heavy influence by the military). 
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military offenses, regular offenses committed by military 
personnel against other military personnel or in military places, 
and offenses connected with military service and duties.307 
Overall, the 1982 language of Article 145 creates a duality in the 
justice system, under which a civilian and a military officer can 
be tried in different courts.308 These courts are regulated by 
different laws and, therefore, receive different sentences for the 
same offense.309 The revisions to Article 145 do not eliminate 
this dual mechanism, but do limit military courts’ jurisdiction in 
some situations.310 Removing from the text “offenses committed 
in military places” in and of itself suffices to significantly restrict 
military courts’ jurisdiction under the 1982 Constitution.311 
The Package limits military courts’ jurisdiction over military 
offenses and stipulates that criminal offenses by military 
personnel against state security, the constitutional order, or its 
functioning shall be under the jurisdiction of civilian courts.312 
The Package proposes equal treatment of civilian offenses 
against the existing 1982 constitutional order and a military 
general’s offense against the order, which in the latter case can 
be identified as a coup d’état. Although the limitations imposed 
on military courts’ jurisdiction are necessary democratic steps, in 
view of the recent Ergenekon case, this amendment to Article 145 
does not amount to a reform and remains nothing more than a 
symbolic change in the Constitution.313 In order to achieve a 
                                                                                                             
307. See supra notes 172–77 and accompanying text (comparing the pre-
amendment language of Article 145 that grants military courts extensive jurisdiction 
with the revised language). 
308. See supra notes 172–77 and accompanying text (providing the 1982 language 
of Article 145 that preserved the dual justice system for military personnel and civilians 
created by earlier constitutions and amendments). 
309. See supra notes 172–77 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of a 
dual justice system as established by the 1982 Constitution). 
310. See supra notes 172–77 and accompanying text (providing the revisions made 
to Article 145). 
311. See supra notes 172–75 and accompanying text (noting the changes made to 
Article 145 regarding the limitations on military court’s jurisdiction); see also Part I.D 
(discussing the 1982 Constitution). 
312. See supra notes 172–73 and accompanying text (providing the revised 
language of Article 145 which stipulates that military courts shall have jurisdiction only 
in relation to military offenses committed by military personnel or related to their 
military services or duties). 
313. See supra notes 110 and accompanying text (discussing the Ergenekon case and 
how it is viewed by the public). 
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more than symbolic reform in military justice, high military 
courts must be completely eliminated or at least, judicial 
remedies against their decision must be enabled by the 
Constitution.314 
The revisions in the second paragraph, relating to offenses 
of non-military persons in time of war, bring an end to the 
adjudication of civilians in military court at times of martial law 
as stipulated in the pre-amendment 1982 Constitution.315 Under 
martial law, fundamental rights are withheld, certain powers are 
shifted from civilian bureaucracy to military bureaucracy, and 
offenses in relation to the factors that led to the declaration of 
martial law are handled by martial law military courts.316 The 
Package reduces martial law by closing the door to military trials 
for civilian offenders.317 By removing the final phrase from 
Article 145 regarding the protection of military judges and the 
office of commander in relation to the requirements of military 
service, the Package leaves the issues of military ranking, such as 
promotion and progress of ranks, ambiguous, as they are not set 
forth in the text.318 In sum, the changes proposed in the new 
draft of Article 145 prove to be insufficient in establishing a truly 
democratic state of law. 
The changes introduced in the revised Article 156 
regarding the Military Court of Cassation, are carried out to 
harmonize the language of this article with that of revised 
Article 145, concerning the organization of Military Justice.319 
                                                                                                             
314. See supra note 171 (stating that the existence of a military justice system is 
problematic in terms of human rights and democracy and that, in constitutional states, 
civilians cannot be heard in military courts and military court decisions must be 
reviewed by civilian high courts). 
315. See supra notes 172–77 and accompanying text (illustrating the changes made 
to the second paragraph of Article 145 regarding offenses of non-military persons at 
times of war). 
316. See supra notes 172–77 and accompanying text (reflecting the revisions in the 
second paragraph of Article 145 regarding offenses and persons falling within the 
jurisdiction of military courts in time of war). 
317. See supra notes 172–77 and accompanying text (illustrating the amendments 
in the second paragraph of Article 145 regarding persons and offenses falling within 
the jurisdiction of military courts in time of war). 
318. See supra notes 172–77 and accompanying text (illustrating the changes made 
to the second paragraph of Article 145 regarding offenses of non-military persons at 
times of war). 
319. See supra notes 172–77, 202–03 and accompanying text (providing the 
revisions made to Articles 145 and 156 in the Package). 
2011] TURKEY: CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 345 
The revisions made to these two articles intend to fulfill the 
same objective of strengthening the independence and 
impartiality of the judiciary.320  
Serving the same purpose as the changes made to Article 
156, the revisions to Article 157, concerning the High Military 
Administrative Court of Appeals, aim to harmonize the language 
with Article 145 regarding Military Justice.321 In this case, the 
revisions apply to the functioning of the High Military 
Administrative Court.322 This change does not carry any 
reforming value because it does not introduce a change in the 
court system that was established under the 1982 Constitution.323 
The Package could have taken a further step by abolishing the 
High Military Administrative Court and transferring its duties to 
a civilian counterpart.324 
The revisions to articles analyzed in Part A of this Section 
regarding human rights issues, and the articles analyzed in Part 
B regarding the organization of the judiciary, the HSYK, and the 
military justice system, constitute common goals for the AKP and 
the EU.325 As such, EU representatives welcomed the 2010 
referendum results as a step toward the modernization of the 
state in line with Western principles.326 At the same time, the 
political pasts of the AKP deputies and the motivations of the 
political forerunners of the party have raised eyebrows not only 
                                                                                                             
320. See supra notes 172–77, 202–03 and accompanying text (depicting the 
changes made to Article 145 and 156 regarding the military justice and the Military 
Court of Cassation). 
321. See supra notes 202–05 and accompanying text (illustrating the amendments 
in the revised language of Article 156 and 157 that contain changes to the organization 
and functioning of military high courts). 
322. See supra notes 186–87 and accompanying text (illustrating the revisions in 
the Package regarding the High Military Administrative Court). 
323. See supra notes 179–80 (discussing Article 156 in the1982 Constitution prior 
to the Package); see also Part I.D (summarizing the drafting process of the 1982 
Constitution and changes it introduced). 
324. See supra notes 171 and 313 (stating in constitutional states, civilians cannot 
be heard in military courts and military court decisions must be reviewed by civilian 
high courts). In order to achieve this standard in Turkey, high military courts must be 
eliminated or, at the minimum, their decisions must be reviewed by civilian high 
courts. See supra notes 171 and 313. 
325. See supra notes 123–26 and accompanying text (discussing the commonality 
between the reforms necessary for the EU membership and those implemented by the 
AKP). 
326. See supra notes 241–49 (reflecting the statements by foreign media and 
politicians, some of which were EU representatives). 
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among EU officials but also among Turkish citizens, precisely 
forty-two percent of the electorate as measured on September 
12, 2010.327 
The Package as a whole introduces changes that are 
necessary in a constitutional state. While the improvement of 
human rights issues such as the equality of citizens before the 
law and the protection of the privacy are noteworthy 
developments, many revisions proposed in the Package fail to 
fully carry out the reforms to an extent necessary to identify 
them as part of a truly reformist approach.328 This Package 
contains shortcomings and is certainly not expected to solve all 
of the issues in the Turkish Constitution, but it paves the way for 
a new, civil, and democratic Constitution in the future.329 The 
revisions in the Package remove many of the barriers in front of 
Turkey’s democratization and the guarantee of constitutional 
rights and freedoms for all.330 Nevertheless, democratic 
standards need to be taken into account in the AKP’s attempt to 
implement the Package and later during the drafting process of 
a new Constitution in order to ensure an open, transparent, and 
inclusive process.331 
Finally, attention must be paid to the unique political and 
social picture Turkey portrays. Although general consensus 
deems military influence in politics and society a serious 
impediment to the development of democracy, Turkey presents 
a unique case based on a complex history that dates back to the 
                                                                                                             
327. See supra notes 220–22 and accompanying text (indicating the referendum 
results, with fifty-eight percent approval of the referendum and noting the skepticism 
stated by some Turks). 
328. See supra notes 248–74 and accompanying text (analyzing the revisions made 
to the Constitution that broadened fundamental rights and freedoms); see, e.g., supra 
notes 301–02 and accompanying text (noting that the restriction placed on the type of 
YAŞ, HSYK, and Court of Accountsdecisions that can be appealed is a setback to 
achieving a more democratic Constitution). 
329. See supra notes 133–35 and 139–40 and accompanying text (detailing the 
AKP’s efforts to draft a new constitution in 2007). 
330. See supra notes 248–74 and accompanying text (analyzing the revision made 
to the 1982 Constitution that expand fundamental rights and freedoms); see, e.g., supra 
note 285 and accompanying text (listing the articles that amend the organization of the 
judiciary and therefore eliminate many of the provisions implemented by military 
coups). 
331. See supra notes 67, 79 and accompanying text (noting that both the 1971 
amendments to the 1961 Constitution and the drafting process of the 1982 
Constitution were completed with almost no public participation). 
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transition from the Ottoman Empire to the modern Turkish 
nation-state; Turkish Armed Forces have, for decades, 
constituted a critical part of the checks-and-balances system 
thereby trying to maintain the society and legal system based on 
secular Western foundations. In the context of this unique 
structure, the weakening of the military’s central role in Turkish 
politics and society may cause some instability in the country, or 
at least significant and unprecedented changes in the 
fundamental defining principles of the modern republic. It is in 
this context that the 2010 constitutional amendment reform 
package and the September 12, 2010, referendum results must 
be evaluated. 
CONCLUSION 
Ever since the founding of the Turkish Republic, the 
military, high-level diplomats, judges, and academics have 
exercised nearly absolute power in shaping Turkish domestic 
and foreign policy. Empowered as the guards of Kemalist 
ideology and further supported by military-drafted constitutions, 
the Turkish military has historically carried on a supervisory role 
by pressuring the government during different periods to 
execute the policies of its own design. The rise of the AKP 
government is significant in this regard as it seeks to limit the 
traditional role held by the military and to expand the influence 
of the judiciary through constitutional reform, specifically 
through the amendment of twenty-six constitutional articles. 
Given that the majority of the Turkish public increasingly 
supports the AKP’s policies, as is evident in the last two general 
elections, it is very likely that the AKP will continue to succeed in 
its constitutional reform efforts with the goal of democratizing 
Turkish politics and accelerating Turkey’s EU membership 
process.  
Note: The commentary provided in this work on 
constitutional reform in Turkey is up-to-date as of early June 
2011. Since the completion of this Comment, the AKP has 
achieved its third consecutive victory in the general elections on 
June 12, 2011 and has become the first political party in the era 
of Turkish democracy to increase its margin of votes in three 
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consecutive elections.332 According to many Turks, under the 
AKP regime Turkey is witnessing its most politically and 
economically stable periods since its founding.333 This success, 
however, did not suffice for the AKP to amend the constitution 
alone as the party won 326 seats in the parliament, four seats 
short of the number necessary for the AKP to implement 
constitutional changes on its own.334 Instead of a second 
amendment package, in this new term, the AKP hopes to draft a 
completely new Turkish Constitution.335 In addition to the 
Constitution, the AKP has also begun to revise the Turkish 
Armed Forces Internal Service Code, which served as a legal 
cover for the military in the 1980 Intervention.336 According to 
this change, Article 35 of the Code will continue to provide the 
                                                                                                             
332. See Erdogan’s Hat-Trick, ECONOMIST, June 13, 2011 (“The country’s 
charismatic prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, becomes the first Turkish leader 
not only to win three consecutive elections, but to increase his party’s share of the vote 
each time.”). The votes the AKP received were: thirty-four percent in 2002, forty-seven 
percent in 2007, and fifty percent in 2011. Id.; see also Erdogan 1, Ataturk 0, supra note 
105 (“[P]olling shows that more than half of the 50 percent of Turks . . . cast their 
votes for the piously Islamic ruling Freedom and Justice Party (AKP) last month . . . .”). 
333. See Simon Cameron-Moore & Daren Butler, Special Report: Erdogan: The 
Strongest Man in Turkey, REUTERS (Aug. 8, 2011, 12:30 PM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2011/08/08/us-turkey-erdogan-idUSTRE7773X420110808 (“Over the past 
decade, [Erdogan has] transformed Turkey from a basket case dependent on IMF 
loans to the 16th largest economy in the world. He wants Turkey to be in the top 10 by 
2023.”); see also Profile: Recep Tayyip Erdogan, AL JAZEERA, May 27, 2011 (“[Erdogan’s] 
popularity has been boosted further by Turkey’s near-decade of economic and political 
stability under AKP stewardship.”). 
334. See supra note 137 and accompanying text (providing that the minimum 
number of votes necessary to make constitutional changes is 330 votes); see also Turkey 
Ruling Party Wins Election with Reduced Majority, BBC NEWS, June 12, 2011 (“AKP had 50% of the 
vote, which . . . translated to 326 seats in parliament.”). 
335. See Cameron-Moore & Butler, supra note 332 (“Erdogan has been very open 
about his plans for a new constitution that could open the way for him to become 
president.”); see also Erdogan to Work with Others on Turkish Constitution, EURONEWS 
(June 13, 2011, 10:25), http://www.euronews.net/2011/06/13/erdogan-to-work-with-
others-on-constitution/ (quoting Erdoğan as saying: “We will write a civilian, free 
constitution which brings all parts of society together. Everyone will find themselves in 
this constitution, east will be represented, west will be represented.”). 
336. See Law No. 211 of Jan. 4, 1961, Resmi Gazete [R.G.] No. 10703 (Jan. 10, 
1961) (Turk.); see also Abdülhamit Bilici, Gul Urges Change to Article 35 of TSK Internal 
Service Code, TODAY’S ZAMAN (Apr. 28, 2011), http://www.todayszaman.com/news-
242310-gul-urges-change-to-article-35-of-tsk-internal-service-code.html (“In order to 
fully put a stop to attempts by the military to interfere in politics, President Abdullah 
Gül has made a call for change to Article 35 of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) 
Internal Service Code, which is believed to be the main reason behind the military’s 
readiness to stage coups d’état.”). 
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military with the duty to protect the Turkish Republic, but in the 
new language of the Code, this duty will now adhere to the 
parliamentary system, bringing Turkish politics a step closer to 
liberal democracy.337 
 
                                                                                                             
337. See Law No. 211, art. 35 (stating the responsibility of the army to safeguard 
Turkish territory and the Turkish Republic); see also Işık, supra note 82 (noting the 
prospective amendments to Article 35 of the Code, which served General Evren as his 
legal reasoning for the 1982 Coup). 
